Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claims) Settlement Act 1992 : a full and final settlement? by Robinson, Shane Ian.
e 
J\S741 
vuw 
1\66 
R664 
1993 
SHANE IAN ROBINSON 
. TREATY OF WAITANGI (FISHERIES CLAIMS) 
SETTLEMENT ACT 1992: A FULL AND 
FINAL SETTLEMENT? 
L1-M RESEARCH PAPER 
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND THE LAW (LAWS 541) 
LAW FACULTY 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WEUJNGTON 
1993 
- . 
1 
<0 
VICTORIA 
UNIVERSITY OF 
WELLINGTON 
LIBRARY 
TREATY OF WAITANGI (FISHERIES CLAIMS) 
SETTLEMENT ACT 1992: A FULL AND FINAL SETTLEMENT? 
I 
II 
Introduction 
Background 
A 
B 
C 
D 
E 
F 
The Treaty Fis h ing Right 
Fishing Legisl a tion to 1982 
The Fisheries Act 1983 
The Fisheries Amendment Act 1986 
1 How the QMS works 
The Maori Fishi ng Right 
The Maori Fishe ries Act 1989 
III The Sealord Deal 
IV 
V 
A 
B 
Terms of the Se ttlement 
Parallels betwe en the Settlement 
and the Treaty of Waitangi 
C Dissidence in t he Settlement 
Process 
Historical Parallel s 
A 
B 
C 
The Alaska Nat i ve Claims 
Settlement Act 1971 ("ANCSA") 
The James Bay Agreement 1975 
(Canada) 
Conclusion with regards to 
Historical Para llels 
Commercial Fisherie s 
1 
5 
5 
5 
11 
13 
14 
18 
19 
21 
24 
28 
31 
32 
38 
42 
44 
VI 
A 
B 
The Allocation Process 
1 Methods of a l location 
2 The pre-sett l ement assets 
3 Geography or population 
Sustainability 
Non Commercial Fish i ng Rights 
A Regulations 
1 The proposed regulations 
2 Regulations r elating to 
customary food gathering 
3 Mataitai reserves 
(a) Relations hip between mataitai 
45 
48 
49 
51 
55 
57 
59 
61 
62 
63 
reserves and taiapure 64 
4 Conclusion wi th regard to 
traditional non-commercial 
fisheries 
VII Management and Cont r ol 
A 
B 
C 
Consultation 
Dispute Resolut ion 
Resource Renta l s 
VIII Conclusion 
IX Bibliography 
65 
65 
66 
68 
69 
70 
73 
ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this paper is to consider the 1992 
Maori fisheries settlement, namely the Treaty of 
Waitangi (Fisheries Claims) Settlement Deed and the 
Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claims) Settlement Act 
1992; in general terms the credibility of its 
contention to be a "full and final" settlement, what 
could undermine it and to what extent it achieves 
"Treaty Justice". The prospect for success is gauged 
by contrast to overseas experience in North America. 
The paper considers the status of both commercial and 
traditional non-commercial Maori Fishing rights and 
interests under the settlement. An underlying theme 
of the paper is to question to what extent the 
settlement conveys to Maori, management and control 
over their sea fisheries. Whether Maori have to adapt 
to a Pakeha structure and the degree to which this 
could undermine the agreement. 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, 
footnotes and bibliography) comprises approximately 
14,250 words. 
1. 
1. INTRODUCTION 1 
If there are shortcomings in the drafting of the Deed and it 
might possibly turn out in the long term not to satisfy all 
understandable Maori aspirations, it is nevertheless an historic 
step. The Sealord opportunity was a tide which had to be 
taken at the flood. A failure to take it might well have been 
inconsistent with the constructive performance of the duty of 
a party in a position akin to a partnership. 
On 23 September 1992 Ministers of the Crown and 
Maori representatives signed a Deed in settlement of 
claims relating to Maori Fishing rights under the 
Treaty of Waitangi.2 Crown and Maori sought a "just 
settlement" and "the resolution of a historical 
grievance." The Deed purports to be a complete 
settlement, affecting both commercial and customary 
fishing rights. The Deed was enacted on 10 December 
19 9 2 as the Treaty of Wai tangi (Fis her ies Claims) 
Settlement Act 1992.3 Enactment of the Deed purports 
to constitute a "Full and final" settlement of all 
Maori fishing claims.4 
l Te Runanga O Wharekauri Re Koltu Incorporated v Attorney-General and 
others, Unreported, 3 November 1992, Court of Appeal , C.A. 297 / 92, 13. 
2 The Maori signatories represented only 17 iwi although the rights of all iwi 
are affected by the Settlement Act. lwi and hapu that did not sign lose 
rights to enforce the Fisheries guarantee in the Treaty . 
3 Hereafter the "Settlement Act. " 
4 Section 9 (c) of the Settlement Act. 
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For over a century successive fisheries policies 
progressively excluded Maori from the fishing 
industry. The New Zealand Law Commission concluded 
in 1989 that the Crown's failure to give full effect 
to the obligations assumed in the Treaty of Waitangi 
has been at two levels.5 Failure to protect tribal 
fisheries as a property right and failure to preserve 
tribal mana over Maori fisheries in the sense of 
participation in their control and management. 
First and foremost t h e fisheries settlement gives 
recognition to the Treaty of Waitangi as New Zealand's 
fundamental constitutional document. The settlement 
purports to honour the Treaty, repa i r some mistakes of 
the past and lay a basi s for the development of the 
Crown-Maori partnership. "It will change the focus 
of Maori in relation to commercial fisheries, from 
grievance mode to development mode"6 The settlement 
purports to restore Maori property rights in the 
commercial fishing indus try and ensure Maori tino 
rangatiratanga over sea f isheries. 
The Waitangi Tribunal, while recognising the 1992 
fisheries settlement 
reasonable, .... , for at 
as 
least 
"appropriate 
so long as 
and 
the 
conditions pertain,"7 fu r ther qua l ified expectations 
of a "full and final" set tlement, s t ating:8 
Who ca n pre di ct th e future howeve r? Cir c um stances change. 
The pro tec ti o n nee ded for today may be diffe re nt for 
tom orro w . Th e esse nce o f th e Treaty is th at it is all future 
loo kin g. It is no t about finite rules , o r fin al pay - o ffs, no 
matter ho w hand so me . 
5 e w Z ea la nd Law Co mmi ss io n Th e 
- Preliminary Pap er No 9 ( New 
Wellington, 1989)92. 
Treaty of Waitangi and Maori Fisheries 
Zealand Law Commission, 
6 NZPD, no 65, 12817, 3 December 1992 
7 Wai tangi Tribunal Fisheries Settlem ent R ep ort - Wai 307 
(Brooker and Friend Ltd, Wellington, 1992), 11, 6 WTR. 
8 Above n 7. 
3 
As far as the fisheries settlement does purport 
to be "full and final" what are its chances of 
survival? Will history with its "shifting sense of 
justice" overtake the agreement? Objections to the 
settlement have never been far from the surface. For 
some Maori the settlement represents the breach, not 
the honouring of the Treaty of Waitangi. 
Complainants claim treaty fishing rights "are either 
extinguished or made unenforceable"9 Concerns have 
extended beyond the contents of the deed to how the 
deed was executed; in particular, problems of 
representation and ratification. Another important 
concern is the prospective allocation of settlement 
benefits to the Maori tribes. Thus there is "a 
division in the Maori community that reflects in part 
a desire on the one hand to seize the opportunity, and 
on the other, to maintain the integrity of the 
Treaty."10 
~ The Waitangi 
mentioned concerns 
division."11 
Tribunal 
do "not 
suggests the 
demonstrate a 
above 
major 
Two primary objectives identified during the 
"ratification" hui provide a useful yard stick by 
which to measure prospects for the success of the 
fisheries settlement. 
9 Above n 7,4. 
10 Above n 7,3. 
11 Above n 10. 
4 
The objectives are: to restore their mana and 
tino rangatiratanga over fisheries, and to help re-
establish an economic base. The extent to which the 
settlement can achieve these two objectives will 
provide the general focus of this paper. 
The fisheries settlement and more specifically 
the Sealords deal raise some fundamental questions: 
is there inherent potential in the settlement to 
inflict new grievance and injustice? 
how realistic is it to separate subsistence, 
hospitality and commercial fishing as given 
effect by the deed. 
can a commercial enterprise of Sealord's nature 
be adapted to meet fundamentally non-commercial 
needs? 
is success of the settlement contingent upon the 
sustainability of the fish resource? 
This paper aims to provide: 
(a) an outline of the background of Maori fishing 
claims (Part II); 
(b) an analysis of the fisheries settlement (Part 
I I I); 
(c) a comparison with similar failed agreements in 
North America (Part IV); 
(d) a discussion of the commercial fisheries 
component of the settlement, in particular issues 
relating to the allocation of benefits and the 
sustainability of the fish resource (Part V); 
(e) an analysis of the non-commercial fisheries 
component of the settlement, including a 
discussion of proposed regulations which will 
regulate traditiona l Maori fishing (Part VI); 
(f) consideration of the extent to which Maori have 
acquired management and control over their 
fisheries (Part VII ) . 
5 
II BACKGROUND12 
A The Treaty Fishing Right 
Under article 2 of the Treaty of Waitangi the 
Crown guarantees to Maori tino rangatiratanga and the 
full, exclusive and undisturbed possession of their 
lands, estates, forests, fisheries and other 
properties. 
B Fishing Legislation to 1982 
The Waitangi Tribunal in its Muriwhenua Report13 
stated:14 
Few New Zealanders, we suspect, appreciate the extent of 
early Maori fishing activities, that by state action their 
development of those fisheries were discouraged, or that Maori 
have never abandoned their claims to their original fishing 
entitlements. 
The extent of a Maori economy in fishing is well 
documented by the Waitangi Tribunal. Maori around 
the Hauraki Gulf, for example, supplied thousands of 
kits of oysters annually at the ports of Onehunga and 
Auckland.15 Up until the mid 1860's fishing was not 
an issue:16 
Maori were unrestricted in their fishing and fish trade and 
they in turn had no reason to seek limits on the settler's 
fishing, for the settlers fished mainly for their subsistence and 
personal needs. Then, somewhere in the historical process, the 
roles became reversed. 
The Waitangi Tribunal identified the 1860's as 
"marking the turn of the tide." The Oyster Fisheries 
Act 1866 began a process of legislative dislocation 
between Maori and their fisheries. 
12 See generally above n 5; Waitangi Tribunal Muriwhenua Fishing Report-
Wai 22 (Department of Justice, Wellington, 1988); Waitangi Tribunal Ngai 
Tahu Sea Fisheries Report-Wai 27 (Brooker and Friend Ltd, Wellington, 
1992). 
13 Waitangi Tribunal Muriwhenua Fishing Report-Wai 22 (Department of 
Justice, Wellington, 1988). 
14 Above n 13, xiii. 
15 Above n 13, 82. 
16 Above n 13, xv. 
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The premise of this enactment, as with various 
statutory regimes which followed, was the prevention 
of serious depletion of the fish resource. The 
Oyster Fisheries Act was targeted at the commercial 
supply of oysters to Auckland. It regulated the 
commercial development of oyster fisheries by enabling 
closures, ostensibly to protect oyster beds from 
depletion by Maori, and granting leases of Maori 
oyster beds to non-Maor i for commercial purposes. 
Subsequent provision was made for Maori oyster 
reserves but these beds were designated for personal 
needs only. 1 7 Maori were prohibited from selling 
oysters from beds reserved for them. 
The assumptions underlying the Oyster Fisheries 
Act are important. They permeated fishing laws for 
the following 120 years and gave effect to the 
statutory abrogation of Maori tino rangatiratanga over 
their sea fisheries as guaranteed by article 2 of the 
Treaty. Significantly the Oyster Fisheries Act 
established, in statute at least, the perception that 
Maori interests in fishe r ies were non-commercial.18 
The assumptions we re bas ica ll y th at M ao ri fi sheries we re 
res tri cted , both as to th e a rea o f sea used and th e species 
caught , that M ao ri fishin g should be limited to satisf ying 
pe rso na l nee ds, and that fi she ri es co uld be manage d b y the 
sta te as tho ugh Mao ri had no sys tems o f the ir own . 
"The oyster laws assumed t he unrestricted right of the 
Crown to dispose o f inshore and foreshore 
fisheries".19 
17 Section 14 O ys te r Fishe ries A ct l892; none was rese rve d be fo re 1913 and 
"o nl y a ft e r the local beds had bee n severe ly de ple ted b y no n - M aori pi ckings". 
18 Ab ove n 13 , xv i. 
19 Above n 13, 81. 
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The Crown assumed ownership of the oyster 
resource, or at the least, the right to regulate 
access and control. Even the control of Maori 
reserves was assumed to vest with the Crown. 
With the introduction of salmon and trout by the 
acclimatization societies, the government also assumed 
control over fresh water fisheries. The Salmon and 
Trout Act 1867 was designed to protect the fledging 
salmon and trout fishe r ies. Significantly this 
enactment also gave the Governor wide powers to 
protect "any other fi s h" 2 0 "The protection was 
illusory but the control absolute".21 
The dependence of Maori fisheries upon Parliamentary 
enactment was illustrated by the Larceny Act 1869. 
This Act made it an offence to fish from "any water 
which shall be private property or in which there 
shall be any private right of fishery" or to take 
oysters from any bed "being the property of any other 
person and sufficiently marked out or known as such." 
Maori fisheries were not included except to the extent 
that they had been specifically reserved or granted. 
"The Larceny Act affirmed the assumption that 
customary fisheries had no status unless provided for 
by statute or in some deed or grant."22 
Notwithstanding the above me ntioned enactments, 
New Zealand's first gene r al sea fisheries legislation 
did recognise Maori Treaty rights in their fisheries, 
albeit as a token gesture . 
20 Sec tion 4. 
21 R. Walk er "The Treaty o f Waitang i And The Fishin g Industr y" 
Controlling Int eres ts : Business, th e S tate, and Society in New Z ealand 
(Au ckla nd U ni ve rsity Press, 1992) 98, 104 . 
22 Abo ve n 13, 83 . 
8 
Section 8 of the Fish Protection Act 1877 stated: 
Nothing in this Act shall be deemed t0 repeal, alter or affect 
any of the provisions of the Treaty of Waitangi, or to take 
away, annul, or abridge any of the rights of the aboriginal 
natives to any fisher y secured to them thereunder. 
The effect of section 8 was to provide that 
nothing in the Fish Protection Act 1877 was to 
adversely affect any Maori Treaty fishing rights. 
The Waitangi Tribunal in its Muriwhenua Report, in 
reference to section 8, stated:23 
It recognised the Treaty of Waitangi but the manner in which 
it did so illustrates a recurring theme, apparent also in Maori 
land laws (the Native Land Act 1862 for example) that Maori 
concerns for the recognition of Treaty interests could be met 
by mentioning the Treaty in the Act, in a general way, and 
although nearly everything else in the Act might be contrary 
to Treaty principles. 
This statement is supported by a finding in the 
Tribunal's Ngai Tahu Sea Fisheries Report that amended 
regulation's made under the Fish Protection Act 
"purported to limit Maori exemption to taking oysters 
or indigenous fish for their personal consumption only 
and nor for sale. "24 The Waitangi Tribunal in its 
Muriwhenua Report concluded:25 
The more likely event is that sectio n 8 was really window 
dressing, inserted in the face of claims by Maori members that 
the Treaty should be recog nised and fishing rights upheld, 
while no one really knew or very much cared what section 8 
entailed. 
The Fish Protection Act was re-enacted in the Sea 
Fisheries Act 1894 without a new provision to replace 
the former section 8. 
23 Above n 13, 85. 
24 Waitangi Tribunal Ngai Tahu Sea Fisheries Report-Wai 27 (Brooker and 
Friend Ltd, Wellington , 1992) 280. 
25 Above n 23. 
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The 1894 Act repealed the earlier regulation 
permitting Maori to take oysters and indigenous fish 
for personal consumption. "There was no longer any 
statutory recognition of Maori Treaty rights to their 
fisheries." 2 6 Maori could engage in commercial 
fishing, but subject to their obtaining a licence. 
The Waitangi Tribunal in its Ngai Tahu Sea Fisheries 
Report concluded that the 1894 enactment amounted to 
a "clear breach of the Crown's treaty obligation 
actively to protect the rangatiratanga of Maori, 
including Ngai Tahu, in their sea fisheries."27 
The Sea Fisheries Amendment Act 1903 reinstated 
"in substantially modified form" the former section 8 
of the 1877 Act. Section 14 of the 19 03 Amendment 
provided that: 
Nothing in this Act shall affect any existing Maori fishing 
rights. 
The same language was reenacted as section 77(2) 
of the Fisheries Act 1908 but was restricted to the 
part of the Act relating to sea fisheries. Section 
7 7 ( 2) was construed in Waipapakura v H empton2 8 to contain 
no legislative recognition of Maori fisheries. The 
full Supreme Court considered section 77(2) in respect 
of a Maori who was fishing in contravention of 
fisheries regulations and who brought an action for 
wrongful conversion of her nets. Stout CJ held that 
while the Treaty of Waitangi may have provided for a 
Maori fishing right, this had never been enacted and 
therefore the Court could not give effect to or take 
cognisance of it. 
26 Above n 24. 
27 Above n 24. 
28 (1914) 33 NZLR 1065. 
10 
The Treaty "was merely a bargain binding on the 
conscience of the Crown and was not a source of legal 
rights."29 Section 77(2) was held 
saving clause which did not create 
legislation confirming the treaty 
suffice.30 
to be merely a 
rights. Only 
rights would 
The approach in Waipapakura was upheld by the Privy 
Council in Hoani te Heuheu Tukino v Aotea District Maori Land Board 
where it was stated that rights conferred by a treaty 
of cession could not be enforced by courts in the 
absence of specific legislative direction. 31 The 
courts continued to render section 77(2) as having no 
real effect until the case of TeWeehi v Regional Fisheries 
Officer32 in 1986. 
29 Above n 24, 281 
30 Compare an earlier decision in Ba/dick v Jackson (1911) 30 NZLR 343 
where Stout CJ held inapplicable to the circumstances of New Zealand a 
statute that would have conflicted with Maori whaling guaranteed by the 
Treaty. Also note the decision of Chief Judge Fenton in the Native Land 
Court in the 1870 Kauwaeranga judgement, reprinted at (1984) VUWLR 
227,240 where exclusive Maori rights to fish on tide lands on the Waihau 
River were affirmed. 
31 see also [1941] AC 308; Inspector of Fisheries v Weepu (1956) NZLR 920; 
Keepa v Inspector of Fisheries (1965) NZLR 322. 
32 [1986] 1 NZLR 680; discussed below. 
11 
The Waitangi Tribunal has concluded Crown sea 
fisheries legislation during the period 1866 to 1982 
had three main characteristics:33 
a principal concern was to conserve the sea 
fishery resources; 
an underlying assumption was the right of the 
Crown to provide for the general public 
exploitation of the sea fisheries subject only to 
the conservation measures enacted from time to 
time, notwithstanding the fishing rights 
guaranteed to Maori under the Treaty; and 
the failure by the Crown throughout almost the 
whole period to afford adequate legislative 
protection or recognition of Maori sea fishing 
rights guaranteed by the Treaty. 
Thus Maori fishing rights "were declared non 
existent by the courts; although not expressly 
confiscated, they simply vanished by operation of 
law. "34 
C The Fisheries Act 1983 
In more recent years fishing policies have been 
directed to the removal of small and part-time 
fishermen. A new Fisheries management regime 
implemented under the Fisheries Act 1983 further 
limited Maori participation in the fishing industry. 
This enactment was a response to the serious depletion 
of the inshore fisheries. It placed emphasis on the 
need to conserve and re-generate depleted resources 
"and to bring a greater measure of economic security 
to the industry."35 
33 Above n 24, 278. 
34 M C Blumm "Native Fishing Rights And Environmental Protection in 
North America And New Zealand: A Comparative Analysis of Profits A 
Prendre And Habitat Servitudes" (1990) 4 Canterbury Law Review 211, 234. 
35 Above n 24, 217. 
I 
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Section 88(2) of the Fisheries Act 1983 re-
enacted section 77(2) of the Fisheries Act 1908, with 
the word "existing" deleted. Again recognition of 
the Treaty of Waitangi was compromised by other 
important provisions in the 1983 Act. Section 89(1) 
provided the genesis of the Quota Management System 
( "QMS"), empowering the making of regulations 
generally regulating fishing in New Zealand. 
Paragraph (g) provided the origin of the QMS in 
limited form: "Prescribing a quota or total allowable 
catch for any fish, or in respect of any fishery or 
method of fishing, in any part of New Zealand 
fisheries waters; and authorising the Minister to 
allocate any such quota or total allowable catch to 
such commercial fisherman or fishermen as he may 
specify ... ". 
The definition of "commercial fishermen" in 
section 2 was particularly relevant to the demise of 
part-time fishers. In the case of an individual, a 
commercial fisherman was defined as meaning a person 
engaged in fishing for sale throughout the year, or a 
specified part of the season of each year, and who 
could satisfy the director-general that during such 
time as [he/she] engages in fishing for sale [he/she] 
relies wholly or substantially on [his/her] fishing 
activities for [his/her] income. 
"The restricted definition of commercial 
fishermen caused much heartburn among Maori and non-
Maori fishers who overnight were excluded from any 
further commercial fishing. "36 Between 1500 and 1800 
part-time fishers are estimated to have been excluded 
from the fishing industry.37 
36 Above n 24, 218 
37 Above n, 24, 219 
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Most of the remaining Maori fishermen operated in 
the small and part-time way and were affected by this 
scheme. 
Section 28C of the Fisheries Act 1983 provided 
that an allowance must be made for recreational and 
other non-commercial users. Significantly Maori 
interests were grouped with non-commercial interests, 
perpetuating the statutory arrangement that assumed 
Maori traditional interests had no commercial 
component. 
D The Fisheries Amendment A ct 1986 
The Fisheries Amendment Act 1986 established the 
Quota Management System. The QMS has become the 
"cornerstone of the modern fishing industry."38 
Again the scheme's development was projected at 
conserving fish and ensuring sustainable levels of 
fishing. The most radical feature of the QMS was the 
creation of a property interest in an exclusive right 
to commercial fishing. This property interest took 
the form of an individual transferable quota ("ITQ"). 
Individual quota can be readily transferred by sale, 
lease or licence. The ambit of the scheme extended 
to apply to both inshore and deep water species.39 
l How the QMS works 
The Minister of Fisheries can declare an area to 
be a quota management area ( "QMA") . The Minister 
then sets a total allowable catch ("TAC") for species 
of fish in that area. The allowance mentioned above 
for "Maori, traditional, recreational, and other non-
commercial interests in the fishery" is subtracted 
from the TAC to give the total allowable commercial 
catch ( "TACC"). The TACC is then divided into 
individual transferable quota. 
38 Above n 13, 140. 
39 The OMS originally applied to only eight species under the Fisheries Act 
1983. 
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Quota was allocated to existing commercial 
fishers on the basis of previous catch sizes. 
"This restructuring of the industry resulted in 
reducing the total allowable catch by only 5 per cent 
and concentrating 7 5 per cent of ITQ' s in eighteen 
companies."40 Maori fishers were further 
marginalised, those who had supplemented their income 
by part-time fishing were not given quota. 
E The Maori Fishing Right 
"Despite a century of struggle, with no success, 
against the derogation of their fishery rights, the 
Maori did not give up. "41 In a series of Reports, 
the Waitangi Tribunal introduced the concept of Treaty 
fishing rights. In its Motunui Report,42 pollution from 
the Waitara sewage outfall which was damaging valuable 
fishing sites, as well as proposed new discharges and 
a new outfall to accommodate petrochemical industries, 
was found to violate the Treaty of Waitangi. The 
Tribunal ruled that the Crown was obliged to protect 
the Maori interest in fisheries from the consequences 
of settlement and development on the land. 43 The 
Kaituna Report44 found that the then proposed Kaituna 
River sewage pipeline which would have degraded Maori 
fishing grounds also violated Treaty principles. 
40 Above n 21, 107; see also above n 5, 17. 
41 Above n 21, 107 
42 Waitangi Tribunal Motonui R eport (Government Printer, Wellington, 
1983). 
43 Above n 42, 5. 
44 Waitangi Tribunal Kaituna Report (Government Printer, Wellington, 
1984). 
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In the Manukau45 claim the Tribunal found that 
the Manukau Harbour plan neither gave sufficient 
weight to Maori culture a nd fishing interests nor was 
detailed enough to ens ure improvements in harbour 
water quality. 
The next step in the vindication of Maori fishing 
rights was the decision in Te Weehi. Tom Te Weehi had 
appealed to the High Cou r t in Christchurch against a 
conviction for taking undersized shellfish. Te Weehi 
claimed he was exercising customary fishing rights to 
take shellfish for domes t ic consumption. Williamson 
J ruled in Te Weehi' s f a vour. The Judge held that 
Maori customary fishin g title was legislatively 
recognised by section 88(2) of the Fisheries Act 1983 
and thus Te Weehi was exempt from cer tain requirements 
of the fishing laws. Williamson J further held that 
customary fishing rights could exist independent from 
land ownership and they a re preserved until expressly 
extinguished by "clear and plain" legislation.46. 
The interpretation of section 88 ( 2) in Te Weehi 
left open the question a s to what is the source of a 
legal basis to the Maori fishing right. Does "Maori 
fishing rights" as espou s ed in section 88(2) refer to 
Treaty rights or does it refer to r ights protected by 
the doctrine of aboriginal title?47 Whatever the 
source of this legal right Te Weeh i represented the 
turning of the tide fo r the recognition of Maori 
fishing rights. 
45 Waitangi Tribunal Manu k au R eport (Gove rnm ent Printer , Wellington , 
1985) . 
46 Above n 32; citing Hamlet of Baker La ke v Minis ter of Indian A ffairs and 
North ern Development (1979) 107 D LR (3 d); G uerin v The Quee n (1984) 13 
DLR (4th) 321. 
47 See R Boas t "Treaty ri g hts or abori gin a l ri ghts?" [1 990] NZLJ 32. 
The impetus 
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continued 
Tribunal's Muriwhenua Report.48 
with the Waitangi 
The tribes of Muriwhenua 
in the Far North filed a claim against the QMS. The 
Muriwhenua claim had its first hearing before the 
Tribunal on 8 December 1986. On the 10 December 1986 
the Muriwhenua claimants conveyed their concern that 
the Government was about to allocate fish quota under 
the new Fisheries Amendment Act. The Tribunal 
responded by immediately expressing their concern to 
the Director-General of Fisheries, that quota should 
not be allocated until the claim had been 
investigated. The Tribunal was advised that the 
procedures for allocating quota had already gone too 
far.49 
Having accepted that this particular quota 
allocation could not be stopped the Tribunal learnt 
from the Muriwhenua claimants in September 1987 that 
further quota for squid and jack mackerel were in the 
process of being issued. Again the Tribunal conveyed 
its concern to the government without effect. The 
Muriwhenua claimants and the Maori Council filed an 
injunction in the High Court against the issue of 
quota in Muriwhenua waters. Greig J granted an 
interim injunction to stop the issue of quota until 
Muriwhenua rights and the obligations of the Crown 
were resolved.SO 
48 Above n 13; initially the Muriwhenua claims to their lands and waters 
were heard together but events led lo the fishing claim being heard 
separately. 
49 Above n 13, 148. 
50 New Zealand Maori Council and Runanga o Muriwhenua v Attorney-
General and Minister of Fisheries, Unreported, 30 September 1987, High 
Court, Wellington Registry, CP 553 /87; among Greig J reasons was that the 
OMS was operating without taking into account Maori rights in fisheries 
which were protected by s 88(2) of the Fisheries Act 1983. 
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In October 1987 the Maori Council, Ngai Tahu 
Trust Board and other tribal groups filed an 
injunction in the High Court to suspe~d the ITQ regime 
over all tribal waters. These orders were granted, 
51 Greig J advising t he government and Maori to 
negotiate. As a result a joint working party 
comprising four government members and four Maori 
members was established to settle the Maori fisheries 
claims. Maori claimed 100 per cent ownership of the 
fisheries but were prepa red to settle for not less 
than 50 per cent. The Crown would only concede 29 
per cent to the tribes. 52 Unable to agree, the 
working party dissolved itself, issuing two separate 
reports, in June 1988. 
Also in June 19 88, the Waitangi Tribunal 
published its Muri whenua Fishin g R ep ort. The II central 
issue II for the Tribunal was that II fishing has been 
corporatised. 11 53 The QMS was found to be in 
fundamental conflict wi t h Maori fishing rights as 
guaranteed by the Treaty of Wai tangi. The root of 
this conflict was not so much the QMS itself, but the 
guaranteeing to non-Maori, the full, exclusive and 
undisturbed possession of the property right in 
fishing that the Crown had already guaranteed Maori.54 
Importantly, t he Tribunal pointed out that it does not 
follow that because the Treaty i s breached the whole 
scheme must be jeopardis e d.SS 
51 Ngai Tahu M aori Trust Board v A ttorn ey-General , Unre ported , 2 
No ve mbe r 1987, Hi gh Co urt , We llin g ton Regi tr y, CP 559 / 87 . 
52 This 29 pe rce nt tota l would a ll oca te to Mao ri a ll th e inshore (within 12 
miles) fi she ries and 12 .5 pe rcent o f th e dee p wa te r fi she r y (base d on th e 
M aori percentage of populati on in 1986). 
53 Above n 13 , 147. 
54 Abo ve n 13 , 149 . 
55 Above n13 , 150. 
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The Tribunal acknowledged that the QMS has "many 
meritorious features,"56 that many Maori are 
supportive of the system57 and that Maori could work 
within it. 
F The Maori Fisheries Act 1989 
The Maori Fisheries Act was characterised as a 
"breakthrough towards Crown recognition of Maori 
Treaty Fishing rights," the first step "to repair the 
grave infringement of Maori rangatiratanga in their 
sea Fisheries".58 The Maori Fisheries Act 1989 was 
not an agreed settlement. It was an interim 
settlement, planned for review in 1993. 
The Act dealt with both "commercial" and 
"traditional" fishing r ights. The commercial 
component provided Maori with 10 per cent of existing 
quota and a grant of $10 million to be administered by 
the Maori Fisheries Commission. The Commission was 
established by Part I of the Act. Its principal 
functions include the duty to facilitate the entry of 
Maori into, and the development by Maori of the 
business of fishing. The Act required the Commission 
to incorporate Aotearoa Fisheries Limited, a wholly 
owned public company, to whom the Commission must 
transfer 50 per cent of all quota. The balance of 
the quota retained by the Commission is leased by 
public tender. 
Part II of the Maori Fisheries Act amended the 
Fisheries Act 1983 by declaring rock lobsters subject 
to quota fishing and also enacting a new part IIIA of 
the 1983 Act authori s ing the establishment of 
taiapure-local fisheries . 
56 Abo ve n 55. 
57 Above n 13 , 144 . 
58 Abo ve n 24, 285 . 
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The taiapure model provides iwi or hapu with the 
right to manage and conserve the resources within 
their coastal rohe. Section 54C states that any 
person may submit a proposal to the Director-General 
for the establishment of a taiapure. The Minister of 
Fisheries can approve the establishment of the 
taiapure, appoint the committee of management on the 
recommendation of iwi and makes regulations on the 
recommendation of the committee. 
III THE SEALORD DEAL 
Further progress was given impetus when the 
Waitangi Tribunal released its report on the fisheries 
aspect of the Ngai Tahu claim. The Tribunal 
concluded that Ngai Tahu had an exclusive Treaty right 
over all their inshore fisheries and a Treaty 
development right to a reasonable share of the sea 
fisheries off their rohe, extending beyond 12 miles 
out to the 200 mile exclusive economic zone ("EEZ") .59 
The Tribunal reiterated its Muriwhenua finding that 
the QMS, as enacted, was in fundamental conflict with, 
and in clear breach of the Treaty of Waitangi. Ngai 
Tahu claimants however submitted that Ngai Tahu did 
not necessarily oppose the QMS per seas a management 
system. The claimants accepted that a durable Ngai 
Tahu fisheries right in the form of ITQ could 
reasonably 
fisheries.60 
represent rangatiratanga in sea 
The Waitangi Tribunal recommended that the Crown 
and Ngai Tahu enter into negotiations for the 
settlement of the Ngai Tahu sea fisheries claim. 
59 Above n 24, 306 
60 Above n 24. 
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The Tribunal recognised that negotiation would 
require compromises if Maori and the Crown were to 
reach a satisfactory settlement of fishing claims. 
The Tribunal stated this compromise would need to take 
into account a number of external circumstances such 
as the "public conscience," "the nations ability to 
meet the costs" and the "desirability of a permanent 
solution."61 
Shortly after the release of the Ngai Tahu Sea 
Fisheries Report a "totally fortuitous solution then 
materialised"62 Carter Holt Harvey ("CHH"), holder of 
the largest single share of fisheries quota, 63 was 
required to forfeit its quota. 64 Initially Maori 
commercial fishing interests, including the Maori 
Fisheries Commission, approached the government for 
financial assistance to buy Sealord Products Ltd65 as 
a purely commercial venture.66 The Maori Fisheries 
Negotiators then saw an opportunity to link the 
Sealords proposal with the settlement of fishing 
claims. The Maori Fisheries Negotiators in September 
1992 stated "the Sealord proposal, though not perfect, 
offers the best means for Maori to settle commercial 
fishing claims and to get Maori back into the business 
of fishing."67 
61 Above n 24, 307. 
62 J Kelsy Rolling Back the State (Bridget Williams Books Ltd, Wellington, 
1993) 261. 
63 CHH held 26 percent of fisherie" quota. 
64 An increase in CHH's foreign ownership had put the company in breach 
of the statutory limit for foreign ownership of fishing quota. 
65 Sealord Products Ltd was the company holding the quota CHH intended 
to sell. 
66 A special purpose company, Te Waka Unua Ltd, wholly owned by the 
Maori Fisheries Commission was formed to undertake due diligence 
investigations. 
67 See "The Sealord Deal - What it means for Maori "Maori Fisheries 
Commission Bulletin, Special Issue, Wellington, New Zealand, September 
1992. 
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In late August 1992 the Maori Fisheries 
Commission, without a mandate from "Maori", obtained 
tentative government agreement to help it buy Sealord. 
Crown and the Maori negotiators signed a Memorandum 
of Understanding on 27 August 1992, an agreement on a 
proposal for settlement subject to Maori ratification. 
Ratification involved negotiators undertaking a 
national round of hui, consul tat ions with iwi and 
other Maori groups in the three weeks before the 24 
September 1992 deadline. Satisfied that a mandate 
for settlement had been received, the Crown, Maori 
Fisheries Negotiators and iwi representatives signed 
a Deed of Settlement on 23 September 1992. The Deed 
being enacted as the Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries 
Claims) Settlement Act on 10 December 1992. 
A Terms of th e Settlement 
The Sealord's deal affects both commercial and 
traditional Maori fishing rights and Maori 
participation in fisheries management issues. In 
concise terms the commercial arm of the deal involves 
a "lump sum commercial settlement, lodged with a pan-
tribal authority appointed by the Crown. "68 Maori 
receive $150 million from the Crown to finance a joint 
acquisition of Sealord Products Ltd with Brierley 
Investments Ltd; provision is made for the allocation 
of 20 per cent of all quota for new species brought 
into the QMS to Maori (in addition to the 10 per cent 
of previous quota tra nsferred under the Maori 
Fisheries Act) and the Maori Fisheries Commission is 
reconstituted into the Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries 
Commission. The Commission's functions include 
devising a procedure for t he prospective allocation of 
settlement benefits, input into fisheries management 
and the reorganisation of its own membership in 
consultation with Maori. 
68 Above n 62 , 268. 
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The Commission will appoint two members to the 
Fishing Industry Board ("FIB").69 The Minister of 
Fisheries is required to consult with the Commission 
on various fishing management issues, for example TACC 
setting, appropriate deemed value of fish and species 
or class of fish subject to the QMS. 
In return Maori agree that the settlement "shall 
discharge and extinguish all commercial fishing rights 
and interests of Maori;"70 the discontinuance of all 
fisheries litigation by all Maori against the Crown 
(Iwi and Hapu that did not sign also lose rights to 
enforce the fisheries guarantee in the Treaty): 71 
unconditional acceptance and endorsement by Maori of 
the QMS, thus "conceding the Foundations on which the 
entire Fisheries litigation had been fought: "72 and 
the removal of the Waitangi Tribunal's jurisdiction to 
inquire or further inqui r e, or to make any finding or 
recommendation in respec t of: 
(a) Commercial fishing or commercial fisheries 
(within the meaning of the Fisheries Act 
19 8 3) ; or 
(b) The Deed of Set tlement; or 
(c) Any enactment, to the extent that it relates 
to such commer cial fishing or commercial 
fisheries . 
69 The Fishing Industr y Boa rd is a statuto r y bod y compnsrn g gove rnm ent 
and fi shing re prese ntati ves whi ch plays a key ro le in fi sher ies ma nage ment. 
70 The Settlement A ct se ttles a ll M ao ri co mm ercia l fi shing claims found ed 
on rights ari sing b y o r in co mm on la w (i ncludin g customar y and aborig inal 
title), th e Treat y o f Waita ngi, statute o r oth er wise, and cla ims whi ch have 
bee n th e subj ec t o f adjudica ti on b y th e co urts o r a n y reco mm end ations from 
th e Waitangi Tribuna l. 
71 Trea t y o f Waita ng i Fishe ries Co mmiss ion H ui -A- Tau (Treaty o f Waitangi 
Fisheries Commiss ion , Wellington , 31 Jul y 1993) 16. 
72 Above n 62 , 267 
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The Crown's continuing obligations include the 
appointment of Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries 
Commissioners after consultation with Maori and the 
approval of allocation principles. The appointment 
of thirteen Commissioners took place in June 1993 amid 
some controversy. Proceeding's seeking judicial 
lodged but later review of the appointments were 
withdrawn.73 
Traditional 
Sealord deal. 
88(2) of the 
fisheries took a back seat in the 
The Settlement Act repealed section 
Fisheries Act 1983.74 Judicially 
recognised customary fishing rights were extinguished 
with obligations resting on the Crown to make 
provision for the introduction of regulations 
recognising and providing for customary food gathering 
interests, "to the extent that such food gathering is 
neither commercial in anyway nor for pecuniary gain or 
trade." 
Notwithstanding the New Zealand Law Commission's 
warning in 1989 of the "unreality of trying to 
separate subsistence, hospitality and commercial 
fishing ... ", 7 5 the Settlement Act separated commercial 
from traditional fishing rights. Contrary to Maori 
custom traditional fishing can no longer have a 
commercial component. Maori fishing in the customary 
sense extends beyond the use of fish resources for 
personal and family consumption and the provision of 
food at hui, to include trading in the form of gift 
exchange.76 Thus, how appropriate is it to draw a 
distinction between commercial and traditional Maori 
fishing? 
73 The proceeding's were led by Matiu Rata but later withdrawn on the 
advice of the Northern tribes. 
74 Section 34. 
75 Above n 5, 35. 
76 Above n 5, 32. 
LAW ueRARY 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF W.ELUNGT°" 
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Traditional fishing rights under the Act will 
continue to give rise to Treaty obligations on the 
Crown. The Waitangi Tribunal will continue to have 
jurisdiction to hear claims from Maori in respect of 
non-commercial and traditional Treaty rights. Beyond 
this traditional fishing rights will no longer have 
legal effect, either as a defence to prosecution or in 
civil proceedings. 
B Parallels between the Settlement and the Treaty of Waitangi 
Ranginui Walker has observed that the Deed of 
Settlement has "remarkable parallels with the Treaty 
of Waitangi."77 
7 8The parameters of the document were drawn up and 
defined by the Crown ..... All the Maori negotiators ..... were in 
the weak position of being cosseted in the Beehive with the 
Crown partner, and therefore isolated from the collective 
wisdom and strength of their people. 
The potential for further injustice and grievance 
was fuelled by the commercially driven negotiation 
process. "Several days of intense negotiations took 
place in secret, under conditions of strict 
confidentiality, and driven by a tight commercial 
deadline."79 Time for extended reflection and 
informed consensus gave way to commercial expediency. 
The Maori negotiators emphasised that it would take 
at least ten years for Maori to acquire, through any 
other means, half the quantity of quota which was to 
be handed over as part of the Sealord deal. The 
negotiators further warned there was no guarantee that 
other means, such as going back to court, would result 
in any extra quota at al l .BO 
77 R. Walker "Changes to the Traditional Model of Maori Leadership" 
Unpublished, November 1992. 
78 Above n 77. 
79 Above n 62, 264. 
80 Above n 67. 
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It is against this background that the 
negotiators spent three weeks in September 1992 
promoting the Memorandum of Understanding in a series 
of hui to gain a mandate to close the deal. The 
quality of this consultat ion has been questioned.81 
Deference to commercial confidentiality meant some 
details of the deal could not be disclosed - "totally 
contrary to Maori decision making processes - leaving 
many unanswered questions about the benefits to 
Maori."82 
Ranginui Walker described the process as "like a 
mini-government [which] went around the tribes 
belatedly seeking a mandate for what was in effect a 
fai t accompli" 83 Tribal endorsement was far from 
complete but sufficient, it was evidently felt, for 
the agreement to proceed t o signature." 84 Concession 
to commercial expediency extended to the signing of 
the Deed of Settlement o n 23 September 1992. Kelsey 
states:85 
Represe nta ti ves of many, but not a ll ,Iwi and Maori 
orga nisations with fis hing inte res ts had bee n ga th ered a t the 
Bee hi ve. They were give n three hours to scrutinise and 
app rove the co mplex and techni cal deed . Few had much 
g rasp o f the deta ils, whi ch had bee n negoti ated in secret right 
up to th e las t minute. 
McHugh has suggested that major parts of the 
settlement return Maori to the "non- legal vacuum" 
associated with the WiParata86 case. 
81 See ge nerall y above n 7; above n 62, 266. 
82 Above n 62, 266 . 
83 Above n 79. 
84 P .G. M cHugh "Sea lords and shark s: The Maori Fisheri es Agree ment (1992)" 
[1992 ] NZLJ 354. 
85 Ab ove n 62, 264 -65. 
86 WiParata v Bishop of We llin gton (1877) 3 NZ Jur (NS) SC 72. 
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In WiParata it was held deeds of cession by which 
Maori relinquished their Crown recognised customary 
property rights in exchange for a Crown derived title 
were unenforceable in the courts.87 The courts also 
ruled, as already mentioned in this paper, that the 
Treaty was not self-executing. In order for its 
promises to be judicially enforceable they had to be 
enacted by Parliament. 88 Interrelated to this was 
the courts view of the Treaty as a legal nullity on 
the basis that Maori lacke d polit i cal organization and 
therefore could not act as a sovereign body under 
international law. 
It is in these respects that the 1992 Deed and 
its subsequent enactment possess striking parallels 
with the Treaty of Waitangi. Again Maori are giving 
up their claim to a traditional property right in 
exchange for a property interest under the QMS, 
derived from statute. McHugh observes, "much of t he 
Deed of Settlement rests upon an agreement by the 
Crown to introduce and s e cure Parliament's passage of 
legislation."89 Many of the condi t ions attached to 
the Sea lord transaction are unenforceable. The 
enactment of legislation to meet these condition's are 
within the "undisputed a nd undi s putable province of 
Parliament and completely beyond any form of judi cial 
review."90 
87 See M cHugh , above n 84, 356. 
88 Hoani Te Heuh eu Tukino v Aotea District Maori Land Board [1914] NZLR 
590, [1941] A C 308. 
89 Above n 84, 356 
90 Ab ove n 89. 
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The Court of Appeal recognised that their is "an 
established principle of non-interference by the 
Courts in Parliamentary proceedings." 91 "Accordingly 
the clause purporting to be an agreement by the Crown 
to introduce legislation to a described effect cannot 
have any legal effect."92 
Similarly it is not clear who the agreement is 
with "since 'Maori' are not a separate, legal or 
corporate unit." 9 3 Indeed the term "Maori", used 
repeatedly in the Deed of Settlement, is not defined. 
These factors underlie the Court of Appeal's ruling 
that:94 
Nothing in ..... the Deed as a whole should be allowed to 
obscure the truth that the Deed is a compact of a political 
kind, its subject-matter so linked with contemplated 
Parliamentary activity as to be inappropriate for contractual 
rights. 
The Deed of Settlement and the Sealord deal per 
se place recognition of Maori fishing rights back in 
the area of faith. Recognition of traditional Maori 
fishing rights for example is wholly contingent upon 
the Crown introducing regulations. Maori must, not 
for the first time, rely on the good faith of the 
Crown. McHugh aptly states: "It is almost as 
though history were being agreed to repeat itself."95 
91 Above n 1, 15. 
92 Above n 1, 16. 
93 Above n 84. 
94 Above n 1, 17. 
95 Above n 89. 
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C Dissidence in the Settlement Process 
Dissenting tribes, including the Chatham Island's 
te iwi Moriori, Ngati Kahungunu and Ngati Toa, 
responded swiftly to the Deed of Settlement. This 
response included the bringing of proceedings 
challenging the Deed in the High Court. The Crown 
responded with an application to strike out the 
statement of claim. Heron J declined both 
applications. On Appeal, the main criticisms 
directed at the Deed by t he Maori claimant's were that 
the Sealord's deal provides for an investment interest 
rather than for Maori to be engaged in fishing; 96 
that it purports to provide for legislation 
extinguishing Treaty rights and to be a permanent 
settlement.97 
The Court of Appeal acknowledged that the Deed is 
a "most unusual document and, perhaps even designedly, 
obscure in some major respects."98 The Court 
recognised that it cou l d not "determine with any 
accuracy the degrees of support and opposition that 
the proposal in the Deed has from i wi generally, still 
less from hapu or individual Maori generally." 99 The 
Court of Appeal conclude d: All that can safely be 
said is that the Deed was negotiated by some 
responsible Maori leaders and has significant Maori 
support but also significant Maori opposition."100 
96 This point is di scu ssed more full y below. 
97 Above n 1, 11 . 
98 Above n 97 . 
99 Above n 1, 14. 
100 Abo ve n 99. 
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The Court indicated its general support for the 
Sea lord deal, suggesting that the proposal of the 
Crown and the Maori negotiators "to endeavour to 
obtain a substantial Maori interest in Sealord is 
thoroughly consistent with the approach of this Court 
in previous cases."101 "All that can be said now is 
that a responsible and major step forward has been 
taken. "102 With regard to the longevity of the 
settlement and the exclusion of redress to the courts, 
Cooke P stated:103 
Should any legislation be enacted in this field, there could be 
little point in bringing the matter before the courts until at 
least some years of experience have been gained, and perhaps 
not even then. 
Kelsey aptly states the Court of Appeal "left the 
door ajar to future generations but only by an 
inch."104 
Issues of representation and complaints of 
insufficient consent at the ratification stage were 
among the main concerns in an urgent claim to the 
Waitangi Tribunal. It was claimed the Memorandum of 
Understanding was not presented or properly explained 
at some meetings and that proper agreement could not 
be attained if people were not well informed. It was 
contended there were significant uncertainties, such 
as the regulations to be made and the method of 
allocation of benefits, which brought into question 
the consent to the Deed. 
101 Above n l, 12-13 
102 Above n 1, 18. 
103 Above n 102. 
104 Above n 72. 
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The Waitangi Tribunal acknowledged the issue of 
consent raised many difficulties. Some complainant's 
argued each hapu had to agree, not some large iwi 
group purporting to ac t on their behalf. The 
Tribunal however concluded that there was sufficient 
Maori support and acknowledged that while it is hapu 
who generally have the main interest in fishing "it is 
appropriate and not inconsistent with the Treaty, that 
a national settlement in fisheries should be ratified 
at no less than iwi leve l ."105 
Concern was expressed that the Deed extinguished 
rather than fulfilled the Treaty obligations and that 
the Deed does not see the Treaty as a living and on-
going covenant but as something to be ended. The 
Waitangi Tribunal attributed some of this concern to 
the "inevitable haste" i n drafting the Deed. It was 
found that the Deed was "not packaged well for Maori" 
and that "a poverty of s p irit in the operative parts" 
was evident. Dissenting tribes were concerned they 
would remain bound by a deal which terminated their 
rights and to which they had not agreed. 
The Tribunal agreed that legislating to 
extinguish Treaty fishing interests would be 
inconsistent with the Treaty and prejudicial to Maori 
and recommended that the i mpendi ng l egislation make no 
provision for extinguishment. The Tribunal also 
recommended fish regulations and policies be 
reviewable in the court s and that the courts be 
empowered to have regard to the settlement in the 
event of future claims affecting commercial fish 
management laws. Alternatively the Tribunal 
considered it reasonable that the Crown place a 
moratorium on such claims for a te r m not exceeding 25 
years. 
105 Above n 7 , 23 . 
I 
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Provided it was limited to one generation the 
Tribunal considered it reasonable that the settlement 
should bind all tribes, whether they signed or not. 
This practical compromise recommended by the Tribunal, 
as with most of the Tribunal's recommendations in the 
Settlement Report, were not heeded by the government. 
"The dissenting tribes would remain bound by a deal 
which terminated their rights and to which they had 
not agreed."106 The Crown maintained its stance that 
the deal should be seen as a permanent solution. 
Dissent spread into the international arena. 
Former Secretary for Maori Affairs Tamati Reedy, 
presenting the National Maori Congress's address to 
the United Nation's special session marking the 
international year of indigenous peoples, "described 
the deal as an 'an act of violation' by the New 
Zealand government on a par with the land 
confiscations and denial of Maori rights during 
colonial rule." 107 Similar sentiments were expressed 
by Moana Jackson to a United Nations indigenous 
peoples' conference in Geneva. 
IV HISTORICAL PARALLELS 
Former Prime Minister David Lange has predicted 
that history, with its shifting sense of justice, will 
probably overtake the fisheries agreement.108 Two 
recent multi-million dollar settlements in North 
America, the Alaska and James Bag Agreements, 
illustrate "that full and final settlements only work 
when they provide adequate redress on terms which 
current and future generations will view as just."109 
106 Above n 72. 
107 Above n 68. 
108 See McHugh, above n 84. 
109 Above n 68. 
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Neither the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act 
1971 110 nor the James Bay Agreement 1975 are today 
regarded as having achieved the lasting settlements 
contemplated at their respective moments of settlement 
under twenty years ago . As far as the fisheries 
settlement does purport t o be "full and final" it is 
appropriate to consider the extent to which it 
duplicates the failed North American models. 
A The Alaska Native Claims S ettlement A ct 1971 ("ANCSA ") 
Twenty years ago, Alaskan Natives had staked 
claims to almost all of Alaska's 375 million acres. 
Pressure to settle escalated in 1970 after the 
discovery of oil deposits. ANCSA devised a plan of 
property settlement for the Native peoples of Alaska, 
providing both land and cash settlement to satisfy 
claims. The Natives received title to 44 million 
acres of land, about ten percent of Alaska's territory 
and $962.5 million, about 3 dollars per acre. 
The distribution of the settlement was 
complicated by the requirement that the Natives 
establish corporations under statute law. It is 
these formed corporations that collected the proceeds 
from the cash settlement and from the revenues 
generated by the corporations profits. 111 ANCSA 
established 12 regional corporations and more than 200 
village corporations. The typical village 
shareholder would own one hundred shares in the 
village corporation and one hundred shares in the 
regional corporation. No one born after December 18, 
1971, the date ANCSA was passed, would receive shares. 
110 Hereafter "AN CSA". 
111 J .A. Bowen "The Option o f Prese rving A Heritage: The 1987 Am endm ents 
To The Alaska Native Claim s Settle ment A ct" (1989) 15 Am erican Indian 
Law Revi ew 391. 
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Originally shares could not be traded on the open 
market for a twenty year period. Restrictions on 
alienating shares were extended, after fears were 
expressed that Native ownership could be overtaken by 
outside entities. The alienation restrictions were 
to end in early 1992. 
ANCSA, like Sealord's, was hailed as a new 
departure for the resolution of aboriginal claims. 
ANCSA purported to give Natives control over their 
land and assets. Aborigi nal t i tle of Alaskan Natives 
to their land throughout Alaska was extinguished, 
along with their aborigi nal right to hunt and fish. 
The New Zealand fisherie s settlement is similar, the 
restoration of Maori property rights to their 
commercial fisheries in exchange for the 
extinguishment of customary fish i ng rights and the 
full and final settlement of commercial claims. 
The similarity extends to the form of settlement, 
both involving the use of corporate entities and the 
market place as a means of settlement. There are, 
however, key differences . ANCSA provided Native 
Alaskans with capital but left them to their own 
devices to find or create economic opportunity. They 
had to formulate their business purposes after the 
fact.112 The fisher i es settlement however has 
restored Maori property rights with an established and 
profitable commercial entity. With regard to the 
economic viability of vil l age corporations established 
under ANCSA, the Alaska Native Rev iew Commission has 
stated:113 
112 T .R. Berge r Vi llage Journey - The Report of the A laska Native R eview 
Commission (Hill and Wa ng, Ne w Yo rk , 1985). 
113 Ab ove n 112, 36. 
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For a variety of good reasons, few village corporations have 
been successful - but not because they are Native corporations. 
In most villages, no commercial business could have succeeded, 
and the bankruptcy of many village corporations seems to be 
inevitable. 
By 1987 only nine million of the 44 million acres 
reached the Native corporations. ANCSA's problems 
were compounded by a lack of commercial expertise. 
Few Native Alaskan' s in 19 71 had any training or 
experience in the management of business 
enterprises.114 In contrast the ability of Maori to 
successfully engage in commercial fishing is well 
documented.115 
The promise of ANCSA to Native Alaskan's has not 
been fulfilled. 
states:116 
The Alaska Native Review Commission 
Having relinquished aboriginal title to and aboriginal rights 
in the whole state, Alaska Natives confidently expected that 
their ownership of the forty-four million acres that ANCSA 
had conveyed to them would be secure and their way of life 
protected. This expectation is precisely what ANCSA has not 
achieved. 
ANCSA's failure can be attributed to a number of 
factors. 
dollars, 
The settlement sum of nearly one billion 
turned out to be modest once it was 
distributed among all the corporations. Much of this 
money was actually swallowed up in litigation and 
incorporation costs.117 
Because of the conflicts inherent in ANCSA, the early years 
of implementing it were characterized by misunderstanding 
and strife. Officers of the corporations had to devote 
inordinate amounts of time, energy, and money to negotiation, 
litigation, administrative appeals, and lobbying. Delays in 
the conveyance of land to the corporations severely 
handicapped their planning and development. 
114 Above n 112, 30. 
115 Above n 12; see P.B. Temm The Treaty of Waitangi and Maori Rights in 
New Zealand (Republished by Trade Union Education Authority, Wellington, 
1988). 
116 Above n 112, 26. 
117 Above n 114. 
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Ultimately ANCSA failed because of its inability 
to strengthen subsistence economies. Its emphasis 
was on establishing artificial economic activities for 
Natives in rural villages. These activities were 
governed by corporate entities as opposed to tribal 
governments. 
The imposition of a settlement of land claims 
based on corporate structures was also considered 
inappropriate. The capitalist model imposed upon 
Native Alaskan's did not fit well with Native Alaskan 
life. ANCSA adversely affected traditional patterns 
of leadership and decision making, customs of sharing, 
and subsistence activities.118 
Nor were the Native shareholders investors in the sense that 
Wall Street understands the word. They were not a random 
group of shareholder!>, but a people bound together by land, 
culture, and kinship ties. 
Sealord's presents a similar scenario. Fishing 
to Maori is about kinship. How difficult will it be 
to reconcile the demands of corporate enterprise with 
culture? Kelsey aptly states:119 
The traditional Maori economy was based on collectivity, 
integrated goals and reciprocity with nature. Capitalism was 
dependent on individualism, self -interest and the capture and 
exploitation of resources for profit. The two could not 
peacefully co-exist on any large scale. 
The devastation of subsistence economies in 
Alaska under ANCSA has been matched in New Zealand 
before the advent of Sealord's. The fisheries 
settlement hopefully provides the link between the 
economy of fishing and the sustenance of communities 
and ultimately Maori culture. 
118 Above n, 112, 28. 
119 Above n 62, 249. 
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Perhaps the greatest challenge of the 
fisheries settlement in New Zealand is whether it can 
revitalise the small scale economies which once formed 
the backbone of Maori communities. The New Zealand 
model avoids the artificial economic activities which 
characterised ANCSA. 
channel the 
commercial 
restored 
fisheries 
The challenge for Maori is to 
property rights in their 
to replace or encourage 
subsistence and commercial activities at hapu level. 
ANCSA was described as a form of social 
engineering, designed to bring Alaskan Natives into 
the mainstream of Ameri c an life. The possibility 
that Tribal governments be used to implement the 
settlement was rejected. In contrast, Tribal control 
of Maori commercial fisheries receives some 
recognition in the fishe r ies settlement. The Treaty 
of Waitangi Fisheries Commission, at the helm of 
"self-management", is 
governance over Maori 
an expression of 
commercial fisheries. 
extent of the Commis s ion's control is 
tribal 
The 
however 
qualified. The Commission is equally accountable to 
the Government, as it is to Maori. Further, the 
Crown retains control over important areas such as the 
setting of resource rentals .120 Kelsey submits, 
under the deal "the gove r nment retained control over 
the nature, extent and direction of Maori economic 
development."121. 
119 Ab ove n 62, 249. 
120 Annual resource rentals a re pa yable b y q uota hold e rs to th e gove rnm ent 
for the pri vilege of ex clusive comm ercial rights to utili se property rights in 
qu ota . The rental is base d up on th e amount of fi sh qu ota eac h fi sher holds, 
th e ra te varying acco rding to spec ies. 
121 Above n 68. 
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It is submitted that the success of the Treaty of 
Waitangi Fisheries Commission could well determine the 
success of the fisheries settlement. The Commission 
faces a dilemma. On the one hand it must avoid 
concerns already expressed to the Waitangi Tribunal, 
of operating as a Maori bureaucracy,122 
..... holding the power and the assets al the centre, that Maori 
would gel shares in a business but not a chance to be in the 
business themselves, or that the scheme would advantage 
groups and prejudice individual initiatives, ..... 
On the other hand the Commission must address the 
need to maintain the central business asset that 
generates the necessary 
the concern as to how 
revenue. This also 
the Commission will 
raises 
effect 
allocation of settlement assets and revenue from the 
commercial property rights. The validity of claims 
to a II full and final II settlement could well rest on 
how Sealord's is carved up. 
Under ANCSA villagers were forced to place all of 
their ancestral lands in the corporation. The 
restrictions on the alienability of shares until 
December 1991 were extended by amendments in 1987. 
The extension however provided for an opt out 
procedure which allowed for alienation.123 
Although the amen menls appear to address the 
concerns about preserving their land, ..... they 
prov1s10ns which serve to potentially diminish the 
ability lo control their land. 
ative's 
contain 
Natives 
For the Native people's of Alaska, 
ancestral land is held in trust 
like Maori, 
for future 
generations. In this respect ANCSA was fundamentally 
flawed by cultural conflict. The focus of this 
conflict is the land:124 
122 Above n 9. 
123 Above n 111, 405. 
124 Above n 112, 73. 
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To one culture, the land is inalienable. Alaska Natives 
believe that land is held in common by the tribe, a political 
community that is perpetual. Every member of the 
community in succeeding generations acquires an interest in 
the land as a birthri ght. But to western society, land is a 
commodity to be bought and sold. 
The fisheries settlement, it is hoped, provides 
the means by which future Maori generations can enjoy 
property rights in commercial fisheries of which their 
predecessors were denied. Statutory distinction 
between Maori commercial and non-commercial fisheries 
and Maori endorsement of the QMS represents inherent 
cultural conflict. Maori commercial fishing rights 
take the form of indivi dual transferable quota, a 
transferable private property right. A key 
difference between ANCSA and the fisheries settlement 
is that under ANCSA shares are held by individuals 
whereas ITQ's will be he l d by tribes. 
Alaskan Natives now realise that ANCSA has failed 
them and that its goals are at cross purposes with 
their own. Today they a r e trying to strengthen their 
subsistence economy and to restore their tribal 
governments.125 
B The James Bay Agreement 1975 (Canada) 
The Fort George area, as with much of Canada's 
north, was being opened up for resource exploitation 
and development. The James Bay project, begun in 
1971, involved the building of a large-scale hydro 
electric power station. In 1971, the Cree of James 
Bay and the Inuit of Northern Quebec were heavily 
dependent upon hunting, fishing, trapping, and the 
harvesting of natural resources of the land.126 
125 Above n 112, 19. 
126 B. Diamond "Aboriginal Rights : The James Bay Experience" Aboriginal 
Peoples and Aboriginal Rights (Un ive rsity of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1985) 
266. 
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The government of Quebec was firm in its view 
that the Cree and Inuit contested in Court the 
original development plans. Billy Diamond states:127 
To assess properly the strength of our claim based on 
aboriginal rights, it must be recalled that in 1971 the official 
position of the federa l government was that aboriginal rights 
would not be recogni7ed; the Supreme Court of Canada would 
not hear the Calder case until 1973 ..... At the time that we 
initiated our court proceedings, the British Columbia Court of 
Appeal had ruled against the Nishga 's claim to aboriginal title. 
At the time the Cree and Inuit initiated 
proceedings, no court in Canada had ever granted an 
injunction based on a violation of aboriginal 
rights.128 After a long and complex court case, Mr 
Justice Malouf held that the Cree and the Inuit had 
some apparent rights in the territory. The practical 
effect of the judgment was to shut down all 
development in the traditional area of the Cree and 
Inuit. 
A short time after, three justices of the Quebec 
Court of Appeal, suspended the effect of Mr. Justice 
Malouf's injunction.129 
127 Above n 126, 268. 
128 Above n 126, 269. 
129 Kanatewat v James Bay Development Corp. (1974) R P 38 (C5); rev'd 
(1975) C A 166 (QCA) . 
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The Quebec Government made an offer of settlement 
to the Cree and Inuit. Although they did not regard 
the offer as a good one, the Cree and Inuit 
reluctantly decided to negotiate.130 They felt their 
chances of winning the c ase in the Quebec Court of 
Appeal and probably in t he Supreme Court of Canada 
were minimal. The Cree and the Inuit also feared, 
even if they did win i n the courts, the Federal 
Parliament would respond to political pressures from 
the Quebec Government and eventually pass a law 
extinguishing aboriginal rights. 
The negotiations led to an agreement which the 
Cree and the Inuit felt was an acceptable settlement, 
bearing in mind their tenuous situation. The 
Agreement effected a ces s ion and surrender of all the 
native claims, rights, titles, and interests of the 
Cree and the Inuit in and to land in Quebec. In 
return they received land in fee simple (the I nuit 
received two million acres, the Cree about one mil l ion 
acres) and the exclusive right to hunt, fish, and trap 
on an additional thirty- e ight million acres. 
The James Bay Agreement is a good example of how 
a shifting sense of justic e can overtake an agreement. 
At the time the agreement was signed claims to 
aboriginal title were not recognised i n Canada and the 
Cree and the Inuit had t o negotiate on that basis. 
The development of the doctrine of aboriginal title 
and its subsequent recognition131 has meant the ground 
rules have significantly changed. 
130 See ge nerall y B. D iamo nd , abo \ e n 126. 
13 1 Th e ex iste nce o f abori g in al title is now recogni se d by th e law o f Canada: 
see Calder v A ttorney-General of British Columb ia [1973] SCR 313 , (1973) 34 
DLR (3 rd) 145: Guerin v Th e Queen [1984] 2 SC R 335, (1984) 13 DLR 321 
(4th) ; R v Sparrow [1 987 ] 2 WWR 577, 246. 
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The nature of the Native claim to the land has 
changed. Added to this has been controversy over 
exactly what was surrendered. Billy Diamond suggests 
the extinguishment of Cree and Inuit claims did not 
effect extinguishment of aboriginal title.132 
Whether the ground r ules change with respect to 
Sealord's in ten or twenty years from now is a moot 
point. The question may arise as to whether the 
Sea lord's deal was assessed as a remedy based on 
"need" or a remedy based on the value of lost property 
rights. Need, like justice, is not a concept which 
stands still. If the settlement is deemed in years 
to come to be based on ne ed its adequacy may well be 
tested. 
Whether the bargaining position of Maori in 
relation to the Sealord negotiations can be equated 
with that of the Cree and the Inuit is debatable. It 
seems Maori generally did regard the terms of the deal 
as acceptable. Equally it could be argued Maori, 
like the Cree and I nuit, felt goaded by t he 
opportunity of available quota to accept the 
Tipene O'Regan, Chairperson of the settlement. 
Treaty of 
that the 
Waitangi Fisheries Commission has stated 
"fragility of the lega l position" was an 
important factor in t he decis i on of the Maori 
fisheries negotiators to pursue t he settlement. 133 
132 Abo ve n 126, 283. 
133 Treat y of Waita ngi F ishe ri es Com miss ion Hui -A-Tau (Trea ty o f Waitangi 
Fishe ri es Co mmiss ion, Wellington , l993) 4. 
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C Conclusion with regard to Historical Parallels 
There are significant parallels between the 
fisheries settlement and the two North American 
settlements outlined above. Maori commercial fishing 
rights under the Treaty of Waitangi are extinguished, 
as are judicially recognised customary fishing rights. 
The structure of the Sealord deal is similar to 
ANCSA, utilising corporate entities and the market 
place as a means of settlement. The "Campaign 
Against Foreign Control of Aotearoa" is critical of 
the form of the fisheries settlement:134 
Maori fishing claims have been successfully channelled into 
the extractive capital ist model, working in active partnership 
with local and international Big Business. They are the 
primary beneficiaries of this, along with a rapidly emerging 
Maori capitalist elite. Ordinary Maori stand to gain very 
little, and indeed have lost all future fishing claims. 
Whether endorsement by Maori of the QMS is 
consistent with an objective to revitalise small scale 
Maori fishing economies is open to conjecture. 
Market forces and the need "to maintain the central 
business asset that generates the necessary revenue" 
may count against getting Maori back into the business 
of fishing. ANCSA's failure is attributed, in part, 
to its inability to strengthen subsistence economies. 
While Maori have been endowed with a profitable 
corporate, it is conceivable that their ability to 
revitalise subsistence economies will be just as 
unsuccessful as ANCSA. 
The fisheries settlement avoids the artificial 
economic activities which characterised ANCSA. 
However the separation of commercial and non-
commercial Maori fishing is an artificial imposition 
which abrogates Maori custom. 
134 M. Horton In Deep Water? Fishing in New Zealand (Campaign Against 
Foreign Control of Aotcaroa, Chris tchurch, 1993) 2. 
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There is also potential for the Sealord's deal to 
be undermined by conflict, especially with regard to 
the allocation of benefits under the settlement. 
Whether the settlement will be viewed in a decade 
or two as providing sufficient redress to Maori of 
their commercial fishing interests is a moot point. 
Significantly the Waitangi Tribunal indicated in its 
Settlement Report that the property interests in 
commercial fisheries restored to Maori were 
sufficient. The Tribunal states, "We are not 
convinced there is a compromise in the quota aspects 
of this settlement, at least on the Maori side."135 
The Tribunal did not accept the view that Maori were 
giving away too much of their commercial fishing 
interests:136 
In 
Most especially we do not accept the view that Maori are 
entitled to 100 percent of the fishery and should compromise 
at nothing less than 50 percent. That view does not derive 
from the tribunal's findings , despite assertions to the contrary. 
The Maori interest has not been quantified, may not be 
quantifiable and the tribunal has said s imply that there should 
be such fair shares as might be negotiated, or failing 
negotiation, as might eventually be recommended. 
line with the Tribunal's comments, a 
significant number of Maori view the settlement as 
just. Only time will tell as to whether future 
generations also view the agreement as just. 
135 Above n 7, 10. 
136 Above n 135. 
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V COMMERCIAL FISHERIES 
The Settlement Act fulfils all claims (current 
and future) by Maori in respect of commercial fishing. 
It applies in respect of sea, coastal or inland 
fisheries including any commercial aspect of 
traditional fishing. The Act states that the 
obligations of the Crown to Maori in respect of 
commercial fishing are fulfilled, satisfied and 
discharged.137 
The Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission holds 
two packages of fishing assets on behalf of iwi - pre-
settlement and post-settlement assets. The 
Settlement Act requires the separation of pre-
settlement and post settlement assets.138 Pre-
settlement assets are those acquired before the 
settlement of Maori commercial fisheries claims - that 
is 10 percent of quota species transferred by the 
Crown, plus cash and shares, under the Maori Fisheries 
Act 1989. Post-settlement assets are those acquired 
as a result of the Sealord settlement. 
The Settlement Act in distinguishing between pre-
settlement and post-settlement assets empowers the 
Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission to allocate 
pre-settlement assets, however requires legislation to 
be developed in respect of post-settlement assets. 
Section 15 of the Settlement Act places a duty upon 
the Commission to develop, after full consultation 
with Maori, proposals for a new Maori Fisheries Act. 
The new Act will make provision for the appointment, 
composition and powers of future Treaty of Waitangi 
Fisheries Commission's and a procedure for allocating, 
in accordance with the principles of the Treaty of 
Waitangi, benefits to beneficiaries under the Deed of 
Settlement. 
137 Section 9. 
138 Section 20. 
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A The Allocation Process 
The Settlement Act did not directly address the 
issue of the allocation of settlement benefits. The 
Waitangi Tribunal in its Settlement Report recognised 
that the "prospective allocation of settlement 
benefits to the tribes caused the greatest 
consternation. "139 Dis s enting Maori felt that with 
principles of allocation yet to be resolved no 
settlement should be agreed to. The allocation issue 
has the potential to divide Maori and to undermine the 
success of the fisheries s ettlement. Kelsey suggests 
division within Maori over allocation is "created by 
the settlement framework dictated by the 
government."140 
The allocation is s ue, it 
complicated by the terms of the 
is submitted, is 
settlement. The 
Settlement Act expressly requires Treaty of Waitangi 
Fisheries Commissioners to develop a procedure for 
allocation to Maori which is in accordance with the 
principles of the Treaty of Waitangi.141 This has 
caused concern that the p rinciples of allocation will 
be fixed on the basis of the only two Waitangi 
Tribunal inquiries whic h have dealt with fisheries 
claims.142 Only two tribes have been heard on those 
principles.143 The Ngai Tahu Sea Fisheries Tribuna l , 
according to Maori Fisheries Commission Chairperson T. 
O'Regan, had confirmed t h e "off - shore equation" as a 
Treaty principle in holding that Ngai Tahu had the 
exclusive right to the deep-sea fishery off their 
shores as against other t ribes.144 
139 Abo ve n 7, 5. 
140 Above n 62, 269. 
141 Section 15 of th e Se ttlement Act amendin g s6 of th e principal A ct; see 
also paras 4.5 and 5.2 of th e Deed f Settlement. 
142 Above n 7, 20. 
143 Muriwhenua and Ngai Tahu . 
144 Above n 142. 
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The "off-shore equation" provides that each tribe 
should be deemed to possess the whole of the fishery 
"from their shorelines to the deep blue yonder." The 
fishery is defined as a "continuation of lines 
projecting into the sea from the land boundaries."145 
It is based on tikanga Maori, or Maori law, in that 
traditionally tribes had authority over the seas 
adjoining their land.146 
The "off-shore equation" or "mana whenua, mana-
moana" principle particularly favours Ngai Tahu in the 
South. On the basis of mana-moana Southern and 
Chatham Islands iwi, who comprise about 6 percent of 
Maori, would receive between 65-75 percent of 
quota.147 
The Waitangi Tribunal acknowledged that:148 
Other tribes had no say on the relevant principles, they 
pointed out, and nor had they the chance to demonstrate their 
special circumstances or to have their treaty fishing rights 
defined according to their perspectives. 
Thus, these tribes had not had an opportunity to 
be heard on the principles, and by virtue of the 
settlement are prejudiced by the repeal of the 
Waitangi Tribunal's jurisdiction to hear their claims. 
Tribes who had been able t o prove their fishing claims 
before the Tribunal would be advantaged. The 
Tribunal concluded that it would be impractical to 
hear each and every fishing claim and that the better 
course will be to seek an allocation scheme based on 
"tika" or fairness.149 
145 Above n 67. 
146 The extent of this "mana-moana" protocol is in dispute - a number of 
Northern tribes contend it applies only lo the in shore fishery . 
147 See "Sharing out the Fish " The Evening Post, Wellington, New Zealand, 
12 August 1993, 11 . 
148 Above n 7, 6. 
149 Above n 142. 
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Significantly the Tribunal stated "that 
allocation should not necessarily be based on treaty 
principles and that previous tribunal opinion should 
not be binding on the framers of the allocation 
scheme."150 
Indeed, "the Sealord deal was a 'full and 
final' ..... pan-Maori settlement and the benefits must 
pass to all Maori."151 Allocation on the basis of 
fairness is inferred by paragraph 4.5.5 of the Deed of 
Settlement. A scheme for the distribution of 
benefits must satisfy "the Crown that all persons who 
may have rights and interests extinguished by or in 
consequence of this Settlement Deed will be fairly 
treated." While the rights and interests of 
dissenting tribes are not affected by the deed, 152 
they are extinguished by the Settlement Act. Because 
the Act is a "consequence" of the deed it is submitted 
allocation must be effected so that all Maori are 
fairly treated. 
Also relevant is that the Crown's payment of $150 
million to Maori under the fisheries settlement "was 
clearly part of a larger plan for the settlement of 
Treaty claims".153 The Deed of Settlement referred 
to a Treaty of Waitangi Settlement Fund "with the $150 
million effectively a first call on any such fund".154 
150 Above n 142. 
151 Above n 147. 
152 Above n 92 . 
153 Above n 140. 
154 Above n 140. 
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The deed also required that:155 
Maori recognise that the Crown has fiscal constraints and that 
this settlement will necessarily restrict the Crown's ability to 
meet from any fund which the Crown establishes as part of 
the Crown's overall settlement framework, the settlement of 
other claims arising f rom the Treaty of Waitangi. 
Kelsey suggests those with significant fishing 
interests would gain preference over tribes with major 
land claims .156 Thus the potential for division 
among Maori is intensified. However another 
interpretation 
allocation of 
is that the Crown is signalling that 
benefits under Sealord' s should take 
account of the Crown's restricted ability to meet land 
claims. 
1 Methods of Allocation 
A more serious concern highlighted by the 
Waitangi Tribunal was that the various methods of 
allocation had not been adequately examined. This is 
attributable to the Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries 
Commission's predecessor, the Maori Fisheries 
Commission, which had assumed that the basis for 
allocation would be tikanga Maori.157 The Waitangi 
Tribunal found that the Commission's annual general 
meeting had not approved allocation based on tikanga 
Maori, contrary to assertions from the Commission 
chairperson, T O'Regan. Indeed at the 1992 Hui-A-Tua 
of the Commission, a number of resolutions concerning 
allocation of the pre-settlement assets were endorsed 
by Iwi. The key resolution asked: "that the 
[Commission] examine the alternative methods to 
allocate, consult with Iwi and have prepared 
discussion material to enable agreement to be reached 
on the optimum method of allocation".158. 
155 Paragraph 4.6 of the Deed of Settlement 
156 Above n 140. 
157 See above n 67. 
158 Sec 1993 Hui-A-Tau above n 133, 18. 
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Methods of allocation examined by the Commission 
include:159 
(i) the location and density of fish caught in 
the seaward territories of Iwi (Location-
Density Method, the approach preferred by 
the Maori Fisheries Commission); 
(ii) the length of Iwi coastal boundaries 
relative to the length of coastline 
traversed by the QMA in which they are 
contained (Coastline-Length method); 
(iii) Iwi population (Population method); 
(iv) allocation to regional groupings of Iwi 
based on either of the three methods above. 
2 The Pre-Settlement Assets 
In light of the Settlement Act's distinction 
between the allocation process of pre-settlement and 
post-settlement assets the Treaty of Waitangi 
Fisheries Commission established two project teams to 
progress allocation issues. One team deals with pre-
settlement assets, the other dealing with post-
settlement assets. While work has commenced on the 
allocation of post-settlement assets, the primary 
focus of the Commission's work has been the allocation 
of pre-settlement assets .160 The Commission has 
accorded the allocation of its pre-settlement assets 
significant priority. 
The allocation of pre-settlement assets is 
relevant to the allocation of benefits under the 
Sealord deal. The Fisheries Commission has expressed 
159 See 1993 Hui-A-Tau above n B3, 19. 
160 Above n 133, 11. 
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the view "that even though the processes are 
prescribed differently, t he principles governing the 
allocation of both sets of assets could be expected to 
be similar".161 Thus progress in the allocation of 
pre-settlement assets will provide insight into the 
workability of the allocation procedure prescribed 
under the fisheries sett l ement. 
During the transition period the Maori Fisheries 
Act 1989 required the Maori Fisheries Commission to 
retain ownership of quota on behalf of Maori.162 As 
an interim measure, desig ned to maximise the benefits 
of the acquired propert y for Iwi, the Commission 
resolved to lease the qu o ta under its control through 
a tender process. "Leasing the quota provides a 
minimum of risk, coupled with an acceptable level of 
return, and provides access to the quota by Maori".163 
Leasing provides "a more acceptable strategy" than the 
alternative of the Commi s sion actually undertaking to 
fish the resource itself. The Commission 
incorporated a Maori development incentive (a level of 
preference) into the tender process which provided 
positive assistance to iwi to lease quota. According 
to the Commission's 1992 Annual Report to the Minister 
of Fisheries virtually all of the Commission's quota 
was leased to Iwi organisat i ons and individual 
Maori.164 
161 Above n 158. 
162 Section 7; th e tra ns1llon pe ri od was to end on th e 31 Octobe r 1992, 
retenti on of own ership relates to qu ota th at is not t ransferred to A otea roa 
Fishe ri es. 
163 R ep ort of th e Maori Fisheries Commission - Te Ohu Kai Moana 
(Gove rnm ent Printe r , We lling ton , 1992) 5. 
164 Above n 163. 
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3 Geography or population 
The major division over allocation generally 
appears to be between the South which proposes the 
mana-moana model and the North which supports a 
population based model. Eighteen tribes ranging from 
Ngati Wai (North Auckland) to Ngai Tahu (South Island) 
defend the division of the resource using the 
principle of mana-moana which they say is grounded in 
Maori protocol - tihanga Maori. The populous and 
mainly inland northern tribes, including Nga Puhi, 
inland Te Arawa (Rotorua) and Tainui of Waikato and 
South Auckland want quota shared on a population basis 
as opposed to the length of a tribe's coastline. 
Northern tribal groupings, including Tai Tokerau, 
Tainui, Te Arawa and Mataatua have formed a 
consortium, "Area One Fishing Consortium", 
representing more than 60 percent of Maori. "The 
Consortium questions the authenticity of mana moana as 
a Maori protocol, saying the debate 'has become bogged 
down with concoctions and new definitions of Maori 
Custom'".165 While accepting mana moana applied to 
the inshore fisheries,it disputes its application 
off shore. "The consortium argues that the mana moan a 
criteria for allocation is only partially developed 
and not appropriate for a 'full and final' 
settlement".166 At the first meeting of the 
reconstituted Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission 
on 31 July 1993, Area One Fishing Consortium 
spokesperson Rihari Dargaville submitted that the 
principles and policies of the old Commission be 
rescinded and a fresh approach be adopted.167 
165 Above n 146. 
166 Above n 146. 
167 Above n 146. 
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"The consortium wants 60 percent of the Maori 
quota and warns that unless a satisfactory result is 
found the whole process will be in jeopardy".168 
The Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission was 
required by the terms of the Settlement Act to decide 
by 1 October 1993 how to allocate .eights to 57, OOO 
tonnes of inshore and deep water quota (representing 
the 10 percent pre-settlement quota). Following a 
series of hui at which tribal representatives failed 
to agree on an allocat i on formula, the Commission 
proposed a temporary c ompromise. The interim 
compromise relates to t he distribution of the $100 
million of fish quota f o r the 1993-94 season which 
commenced on 1 October 1993. The Commission decided 
to distribute the quota on the basis of population and 
nine fisheries manageme nt areas ( "FMA"). Fifty 
percent of deep water fishing quota will be offered to 
iwi on the basis of FMA (i.e. their coastline), and 
fifty percent on the basis of population. All 
inshore quota (100 percent) will be distributed on the 
basis of FMA.169 
Northern tribes challenged the Treaty of Waitangi 
Fisheries Commission's formula, s eeking judical review 
of the way the Commission allocated quota. Northern 
tribes claimed in the High Court that the Commission's 
method of allocation would give southern tribes a 
disproportionate share o f the quota.170 
168 A bove n 146; a co nso rtium pa pe r dated 23 Jul y 1993 de tails the Arca One 
Fishin g Co nso rtium 's pos iti on . 
169 See "Co urt ac ti on possib le" The Evening Post, Welling ton , Ne w Z ea land , 
11 Se ptember 1993, 11. 
170 See "Court dismi sses north e rn trib es ' qu ota challe nge" Th e Evening Post, 
Wellington , Ne w Z ea land , 27 September 1993, 2 . 
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"The northern tribes challenged the legal 
authority of the commission to decide on the 
allocations and asked the court to order the 
commission to halt its p r oposed scheme and to take a 
more even-handed approach."171 
In a judgment delivered on 27 September 1993 
Anderson J dismissed the applications by northern iwi 
but prohibited the Commi s sion from distributing quota 
until 5pm the following day, giving the applicants 
time to provide an underta king to accept liability for 
damages if they were to a ppeal. Application was made 
to the Court of Appeal f o r a stay of the Commission's 
allocation with regard t o the 50 percent of quota to 
be allocated on the basi s of tribal coastline, until 
appeals lodged against t h e High Court's main judgment 
could be heard. Northern iwi acknowledged that they 
were not financially in a position to give security 
for any damages that might occur from delaying quota 
distribution. The Court of Appeal had to cons i der 
whether it would be right to order a stay without any 
such undertaking. 
The Court refused t o extend the order preventing 
the Commission from distributing all of its fishing 
quota.172 Cooke P stated: "We are unab l e, however, to 
hold that the applicants have a sufficiently strong 
case to justify a stay without a realistic 
undertaking as to damage s ".173 
171 Abo ve n 170 . 
172 A rea 1 Consortium L imited v Trea ty of Waita ngi Fisheries Commission, 
U nrepo rted , 29 September , Co urt o f Appea l, CA 224 / 93. 
173 Above n 172, 4. 
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The Court found no evidence that the Commission 
had not complied with the statutory criteria 
prescribed by section 8 of the Maori Fisheries Act in 
deciding on a scheme of allocation. Cooke P 
emphasised that the Commission's quota distribution 
scheme was a 
season:174 
temporary compromise for the 1993-94 
The Court received assurances that the Commission and Ngai 
Tahu and the third respondents regard the scheme now 
challenged as purely an interim one, not intended to influence 
subsequent allocation . 
Cooke P stated that one point of view was that 
the allocation unduly favoured Ngai Tahu and "perhaps 
no one is wholly satisfied with it; but it is not more 
than an interim solution and when seen as such it does 
not appear to be open to a legal attach of any 
strength".175 
Dissent with regard to the Commission's interim 
allocation scheme is not limited to northern tribes. 
Moriori of the Chatham Islands also threatened legal 
action over their quota allocation. They were 
al located "only 19 3 tonnes of orange roughy quota 
available in their area".176 Dissent on both sides 
of the divide illustrates the near impossible task 
facing the Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries 
when deciding on final allocations of 
settlement and post-settlement assets. 
Commission 
both pre-
Clearly 
challenges to the interim allocation of pre-settlement 
assets have been made with a view to the allocation of 
the benefits from the Sealord deal. It is submitted 
that the success of the fisheries settlement will be 
largely contingent upon how those benefits are 
allocated. 
174 Above n 172, 15. 
175 Above n 174. 
176 See "Moriori to take legal action on fish sctllemcnt" The Evening Post, 
Wellington, New Zealand, 11 September 1993, 3. 
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B Sus tainability 177 
It is the Maori o wnership iss ue th at is ge ttin g th e attention, 
and rightl y so , because it is prese nted as th e means to put right 
historic lllJUStice. But it will be a hollow victory if the 
industry co llapses from ove rfi s hing, and that is a very real 
risk. 
Kelsey aptly observes that important questions 
such as the long-term viability of the fishing 
industry were "left-begging" by the fisheries 
settlement. 178 There i s a large body of evidence 
that important species, p r incipally o~ange roughy, are 
being fished beyond lev els of sustainability.179 
Orange roughy, New Zeal a nd's biggest export fishery 
earning around $145 
graphic example.180 
million annually, provides a 
MAF have calculated that the 
maximum sustainable yield for Chatham Rise orange 
roughy is between 3400 t onnes and 5900 tonnes. They 
advised the Minister to s et this seasons catch limit 
at 5900 tonnes, down from 14,000 tonnes last 
season.181 The advised reduction is based on an 
assessment that orange r oughy stock is now between 14 
and 29 percent of its original biomass. Orange 
roughy live up to 150 years, and do not mature until 
20 and 30 years old. Th e fish has a very slow growth 
rate, which means it is particularly vulnerable to 
overfishing. 
177 Above n 134. 
178 Above n 82 . 
179 Sec abo ve n 134; sec "C run ch tim e in deba te ove r future o f rich fi sh 
reso urce" Th e E vening Post , We llin g ton , New Z ea la nd , 15 Se pte mbe r 1993 , 7 ; 
"Co nse r ving Fi she ri es" Th e Evening Post , We llin g to n , Ne w Z ea land , 27 
Se pte mbe r 1993 , 8. 
180 See "Crunch tim e 1n deba te ove r future o f ri ch fi sh reso urce" Th e 
E vening Post , We llin g to n , New Z eala nd , 15 Se pte mb e r 1993, 7 . 
181 Above n 180. 
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Notwithstanding his department's advice, 
Fisheries Minister, Hon D Kidd, MP, maintained the 
orange roughy catch at 14,000 tonnes for the current 
season.182 Helen Hughe s , Parliamentary Commissioner 
for the Environment, concluded in a report Sustainable 
Mana gem ent of th e Chatham Rise Orange R oughy Fishery that the 
orange roughy fishery is in imminent danger of 
collapse. Hughes critic i sed successive Ministers for 
failing to respond t o MAF data urging catch 
reductions.183 
Nick Flanders, vis i ting Fullbright 
Waikato University, say s the lack of 
scholar at 
biological 
information about most f i sheries is strong cause for 
caution. The allocation of quota under the Sealord 
settlement may also have implications for ensuring 
sustainability of the fish resource. Flanders 
suggests Maori unity i s important because Maori 
interests may be different to other quota holders.185 
Since Maori "are establishing long term industries it 
is in their interest to unite to prevent this boom or 
bust cycle".186 
Ultimately Maori property rights to a percentage 
of quota will be rendered u s eless without the 
provision of a sustainabl e resource. 
182 See "Conse rvin g Fisheri es" Th e Evening Post, Wellin gton , Ne w Zea land , 
27 Se ptember 1993, 8. 
183 Abo ve n 133, 32-33. 
184 Ni ck Fland ers spec ia li ses in ind ige nous peo ple and natu ra l reso urces; sec 
above n 147 . 
185 Ab ove n 147 . 
186 A bove n 147. 
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VI NON COMMERCIAL FISH I NG RIGHTS 
A major concern r aised by Iwi during the 
negotiation of the fis heries settlement was that 
resulting law changes and the repeal of section 88(2) 
of the Fisheries Act 198 3 , would remove protection of 
customary and traditional fishing rights. The status 
of Maori non-commercial f ishing rights no longer give 
rise to legal rights and obligations and no longer 
have legislative or judi cial recognition.188 The 
deed and Settlement Act however state that Maori non-
commercial fishing rights and interests are not 
extinguished. They continue to be subject to the 
principles of the Treaty of Waitangi and continue to 
give rise to Treaty obligations on the Crown.189 
While Treaty right s and interests are not 
extinguished in a techn i cal sense, it is submitted 
that effectively this i s the case. The treaty 
interest in non-commerc ial fisheries is rendered 
legally unenforceable. The Waitangi Tribunal's 
interpretation of the deed is that the treaty interest 
in non-commercial f i sheries is "effectively 
abrogated" . 19 0 The right of Maori to take matters 
related to their non-commercial customary fishing 
interests to the Waitangi Tribunal i s continued.191 
187 Section 33 of th e Se ttlem e nt A ct re pea l s 88(2) . 
188 Section lO (d) o f th e Se ttle me nt A ct , para 5.2 o f th e D ee d o f Settle me nt. 
189 Sec ti on l O(a) o f th e Se ttl e me nt A ct , para 5.2 o f th e D ee d of Se ttle ment. 
190 Above n 7, 8. 
191 Above n 190, th ough th e Tribun a l ex presse d doub t wheth e r th e Tribuna l 
ca n unde rta ke that ro le. 
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The Settlement Act provides for regulations to be 
developed by the Crown for the protection of Maori 
non - commercial fishing rights and interests after 
consultation with Maori. 192 Maori will not be able 
to lodge claims with t he courts relating to non-
commercial fishing right s , unless provisions for such 
rights have been included in the regulations developed 
under the Settlement Act. The regulations and 
policies for non-commerc i al fisheries may be reviewed 
by the Waitangi Tribunal . 193 
The Waitangi Tribuna l found that "the provision 
of regulations to perfect, augment or develop the 
treaty right is enti r ely consistent with the 
Treaty". 194 However t he Tribunal stated that the 
effective abrogation of t he general treaty right "is 
neither consistent with the Treaty nor necessary in 
our view". 195 The Tribunal saw "no reason why the 
regulations should not be made to effect the 
principles of the Tr eaty, wi thout abrogating 
anything".196 
The Waitangi Tribunal expressed concern that 
Maori would be prejudiced by the lack of a suitable 
body to conclusively dete r mine whether the regulations 
are consistent with the Treaty and provide adequate l y 
for Maori treaty interes t s. The Tribunal recognised 
doubt existed over whether it cou l d undertake this 
role itself, and even if it cou l d, "we are not 
convinced that tribuna l recommendations substitute 
adequately for court dete rminations".197 
192 Secti o n 34 ame ndin g s 89 o f th e prin c ipa l Act. 
193 Paragraphs 3.5.1.4 of th e Dee d of th e Se ttle me nt. 
194 Above n 190. 
195 A bove n 190. 
196 A bove n 190. 
197 Above n 190 . 
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The ability of the courts to assess regulations 
against broad principles in the Treaty will be 
excluded. The courts inquiry will be limited to 
judicial review and discussions of vires, unless 
provision is otherwise made in the regulations to 
extend their role. 
A Regulations 
Paul McHugh suggests the contention that Maori 
non-commercial rights are not affected by the Deed "is 
simply not true for the Deed contemplates a 
fundamental relocation o f the lawmaking power over 
tribal fisheries".198 The source of the regulation 
of tribal fisheries is "taken from the tribe and given 
back to officialdom" .199 McHugh submits that the 
inclusion of traditional non-commercial fisheries has 
the greatest potential to undermine the fisheries 
settlement. Thus "the Deed of Settlement might well 
have been acceptable t hroughout Maoridom were the 
agreement limited so l ely to commercial sea 
fisheries".200 
"Maori have never taken to the regulation of 
their traditional fishing grounds by Pakeha law and 
its administration by fi s heries officers".201 Maori 
must again adapt to a s t ructure "whose lawfulness 
derives from permissive Pakeha law rather than from 
tribal society itself".2 02 
198 Abov e n 84, 355. 
199 Ab ove n 84 , 357 
200 Above n 199. 
201 Above n 199. 
202 Above n 199. 
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McHugh suggests the Deed of Settlement discloses 
a fundamental intention to return non-commercial 
traditional fisheries to pre-Te Weehi law. 203 Indeed 
the power of Maori over traditional fisheries is 
"diminished to a right to be consulted as to the 
content of the new regulations".204 
Notwithstanding provision for Maori to be 
consulted, a major concer n expressed to the Waitangi 
Tribunal was that too much power was left in the hands 
of the Crown, or its department agents to determine 
the regulations. "There was a very real fear that 
some matters might not be properly provided for, and 
most especially, that the tribal control, or 
rangatiratanga, would o nce more be subverted". 205 
McHugh questions "the likelihood of regulations 
drafted by a central , governmental bureaucracy 
commanding the same responsiveness as that generated 
within the tribal commun i ty itself".206 
An inter-related concern is the lack of a 
guarantee "that anything r esembling t he present system 
of regulation by customar y law will be preserved".207 
The Waitangi Tribunal fo und that it would be contrary 
to the Treaty if no provision to review the 
regulations against the Treaty's principles was 
provided in the settlement. No such provision was 
made in the Settlement Act. The protection of Maori 
traditional non-commercial 
further threatened by t he 
fisheries rights are 
fact that the proposed 
regulations or any fai l ure to make them are not 
subject to court review. 
203 Abo ve n 84, 358 
204 Above n 203. 
205 Above n 7, 9. 
206 A bove n 199. 
207 A bove n 199. 
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"The danger is that Maori interests will become, 
as they have been before, overly susceptible to 
political convenience or administrative 
preference".208 McHugh aptly concludes:209 
The Deed does not guarantee that any new regime for the non-
commercial tribal f isheries will not prejudice the present 
system of Maori custo mary law. If any feature of the Deed 
of Settlement is to sink the agreement and to incur the wrath 
of future generations , it will be that. 
1 The proposed regulations 
Tipene O 'Regan has stated "the development of 
regulations to more ef f ectively protect customary 
fishing rights secured and guaranteed in Article II of 
the Treaty is pivotal to the successful implementation 
of the Settlement Act".210 O'Regan's comment "that 
I have been less than impressed with the dilatory 
nature of the Crown's efforts on this matter to 
date"211 exemplify renewed Maori dependence upon the 
good faith of the Crown in relation to recognition of 
traditional 
interests. 
non-commercial fishing rights and 
Section lO(c) of the Settlement Act requires the 
Minister to make regulations to recognise and provide 
for: 
customary food gathering by Maori ( as long as 
that food is not sold for commercial gain or 
trade); 
protection of place s which are of customary food 
gathering importance (including mahinga mataitai 
and tauranga ika). 
208 Above n 205. 
209 Above n 203 
210 Above n 71, 6. 
211 Above n 210. 
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2 Regulations relating to customary food gathering 
These regulations will recognise and provide for 
customary food gathering by tangata whenua, or persons 
authorised by tangata whenua, to take fish in 
accordance with their cu s tomary practices in any part 
of their rohe. Similar provision currently exists in 
the Fisheries (Amateur Fishing) Regulations 1986. 
Regulation 2 7, "commonly known as the hui and tangi 
regulation",212 is revitalised by the Settlement Act 
to allow fish to be taken for hui, tangi "or 
traditional non-commercial fishing use approved by the 
Director-General". McHugh is critical of regulation 
27, describing it as "an indication of how Maori 
custom is being usurped by Pakeha institutions and 
decision makers".213 
A "Discussion Paper" published by MAF 
acknowledges that "Tangata whenua need to have full 
control over the taking of fish under an Iwi customary 
right, subject to t he sustainability of the 
fishery".214 Thus it i s recognised regulations will 
need to provide sufficient authority to tangata whenua 
to allow them to fully manage fisheries in their 
areas. 
for:215 
According to MAF, regulations could provide 
A syste m to trans fer the auth o rit y to appro ve th e takin g of 
kaim oa na from the Cro wn to th e tangata whe nua and to 
ide ntif y th e prope r so urce o f auth o rit y lo e xe rcise th ose 
controls. 
Thus, the proposed r e gulations have the potential 
at least, to allow Mao r i to exercise a degree of 
autonomy over their customary food gathering. 
212 Kaitiaki o Kaimoana: Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claims) Settlem ent 
Regulations - A Discuss ion Paper (Mini str y o f Agri culture and Fishe ries, 
Wellin gton , 1993) 7. 
213 Above n 203 . 
214 Above n 212, J 1. 
215 Abo ve n 214. 
I 
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3 Mataitai reserves 
The Settlement Ac t provides for regulations 
empowering the Minister t o declare mataitai reserves. 
Mataitai reserves can only be declared after 
consultation (by the Min i ster and the tangata whenua) 
with the local community and after having regard to 
the sustainable manageme nt of the fish, aquatic life 
and seaweed within t h e proposed reserve.216 
Regulations providing for the establishment of 
mataitai reserves can:21 7 
provide for such t hings as are necessary or 
desirable for the s ustainabl e management of the 
fishery resources wi thin the reserve; 
empower a Maori Committee, marae committee or 
kai tiaki of the tangata whenua to make by laws. 
Provision for the making of bylaws will be 
subject to two provisions :218 
every restriction or prohibi tion imposed on 
fishing must apply e q ually to a l l individuals;219 
the bylaws must be approved by the Minister and 
be gazetted in the Gazette. 
These provisions aim to enable the tangata whenua 
of the area "to exercise a greater degree of tino 
rangatiratanga over thos e places which are of special 
significance or importanc e to them as customary food 
gathering places".220 
216 Abo ve n 212. 
217 Ab ove n 2 12 
218 Abo ve n 212, 8. 
219 Notwith standin g th a t th e Act p rov ides th a t res tri cti o ns and prohibiti ons 
must be o f ge ne ra l a ppli ca ti on , if the ma nage me nt co mmittee o f th e rese r ve 
introduces a b ylaw c los in g th e a rea Lo ha rves t b y indi vidu als it may still be 
empo we re d Lo a llo w th e ta kin g o f f ish , aqu a ti c life o r sea wee d Lo co ntinu e 
for purposes whi ch s usta in th e fun ctions o f th e ma rae. 
220 Above n 218. 
I 
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An important quali f ication on the exercise of 
this control is that i t must be carried out in a 
manner consistent with the sustainability of the 
fishery in the area. While it will be possible for 
"mataitai" regulations (and their bylaws) to prevail 
over other legislation in the area of the reserve, the 
approval of a mataitai r e serve will not confer rights 
or responsibilities to Maori under the Resource 
Management Act 1991".221 "Mataitai reserves only 
give exclusive management of the fishery. Exclusion 
of people for purposes o t her than fishing can only be 
made under the RMA".222 
(a) R elationship bet ween mataitai reserves and taiapure 
Section 89 (lc)(a) of the Settlement Act states 
that regulations made to recognise and provide 
for mataitai rese r ves may overrule general 
fishing regulations and those relating to 
taiapure local fisheries regulations. 
Mataitai reserves a pply only to areas which are 
of importance for customary food gathering 
purposes. The Tr eaty of Waitangi Fisheries 
Commission has recognised that concern has been 
raised that the Settlement Act only makes 
provision for regulations dealing with "customary 
food gathering" a nd that "this may not be 
sufficiently broad enough to encompass, for 
example, the use of, say, Seaweed or Rimu Rapa 
for poha" .223 Thu s mataitai reserves do not 
apply to areas wh i ch tangata whenua want to 
protect for other purposes such as their 
spiritual associat i ons with the people or to 
marine species not used for food. 
conceivable that these types of 
provided for by ta iapure. 
221 A bove n 212, 21 
222 A bove n 22 1. 
223 Abo ve n 71, 22. 
It is however 
areas can be 
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4 Conclusion with regard to traditional non-commercial fisheries 
Tipene O'Regan's comment that the proposed 
regulations protecting customary fishing rights will 
be "pivotal" to the success of the Settlement Act is 
apt. Notwithstanding the reservations expressed by 
commentators such as McHugh, the proposed regulations 
have the potential to empower Maori in the management 
and to some extent control of their traditional non-
commercial fishing areas. It is submitted the 
proposed regulations have the potential to provide 
statutory recognition of a "pluralistic legal culture" 
which McHugh submits was developing in the evolution 
of case law as a consequence of Te Weehi. 224 
Nevertheless, the unnecessary abrogation of the treaty 
interest in non-commercial fisheries and the inability 
of Maori to have regulations reviewed as against 
treaty principles in the courts, provides scope for 
future grievance and injustice. 
VII MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL 
Kelsey aptly suggests that under the Sealord deal 
"the government retained control over the nature, 
extent and direction of Maori economic 
development".225 The ability of Maori to manage and 
control commercial fisheries will be subject to 
overriding statutory and market forces. Maori 
economic development has been locked into 
"contemporary market capitalism". With regard to the 
commercial arm of the settlement, fish is viewed as a 
tradeable commodity with little room for non-
commercial concerns such as employment, environment or 
tribal development. 
224 Above n 199. 
225 Above n 62, 268-69. 
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The Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission is at 
the head of Maori management over their sea fisheries. 
The Commission is as equa l ly accountable to government 
as it is to Maori. The present Commission was 
appointed by the Crown, not Maori. The proposed new 
Fisheries Act is expected to provide the means by 
which future Commissions are appointed. While Maori 
will have some input into the Bill, it is government 
who will decide its fina l form. 
Similarly under sec t ion 17 of the Settlement Act 
the Commission may report to the Minister of Fisheries 
its recommendations as t o how benefits from Sealord's 
should be allocated. The Crown "can request the 
Commission to reconsider its proposed distribution". 
Ultimately it is the Crown who make t he final decision 
as to allocation. 
A Consultation 
Maori management 
perhaps more illusory 
ov er their sea 
than real. 
fisheries 
While 
is 
the 
Settlement Act extends the role of the Commission i nto 
a range of general fish e ries management issues, the 
Commission's involvement in key areas of management is 
limited to the right to b e consulted. The Minister 
of Fisheries, for example, is required to consult with 
the Commission when sett ing the TACC for any f i sh 
managed within the QMS o r when setting a TACC for any 
new fishery to be int r oduced int o the QMS.226 
Consultation will at least provide Maori with the 
opportunity, for example , to advocate recognition of 
the Maori traditional component in TACC setting 
procedures.227 
226 Secti on 24 o f the Se ttle me nt Ac t a me ndin g s 28 D o f th e princ ipa l A c t. 
227 In th e pas t th e C ro wn has not ta ke n thi s po rti o n o f ha r ves tin g into 
acco unt se pa ra te ly w he n se tting th e T ACC fo r a n y fi s he ry . 
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The Minister is also required t o consult with the 
Commission on issues relating to the appropriate 
deemed value of fish and species or class of fish 
subject to the QMS.228 Notwithstanding the limited 
extent of Maori manageme nt over their sea fisheries, 
it is a positive aspect of the settlement and the 
evolution of the Crown - Maori partnership that the 
Crown are required to consult with Maori. 
One respect in whic h the non-commercial fishing 
right under the Treaty of Waitangi is not "effectively 
abrogated" is evident under section 10 of the 
Settlement Act. Subsec tion (b) places a statutory 
duty on the Minister of Fisheries, acting "in 
accordance with the principles of the Treaty of 
Waitangi", to consult wi t h tangata whenua about, and 
develop policies to help recognise use and management 
practices of Maori in the exercise of non - commercial 
fishing rights. Nevertheless McHugh is critical of 
the Deed of Settlement, which he states wil l severely 
compromise the tribal aspect of the regulation of 
tribal non - commercial fi s heries . McHugh states: "The 
Deed quite clearly demonstrates an intention to revert 
to the centralised, b ureaucratic and non- tribal 
control of fisheries which marked the pre-Te Weehi 
period".229 As already mentioned above, the extent 
of Maori control over traditiona l non-commercial 
fisheries is contingent upon proposed regulations. 
Contrary to McHugh's concerns, Maori will possess some 
input into management and contro l through their 
ability to make by l aws. Notwithstanding that these 
bylaws will be 
submitted that 
subject to Crown approval, it is 
Maori wi ll have significantly more 
autonomy in the regulation of non - commercial fisheries 
than that which marked t he pre-Te Weehi period. 
228 Sectio ns 28 a nd 29 o f th e Se ttleme nt Act res pecti ve ly. 
229 Above n 199 . 
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B Dispute Resolution 
Conflict between Ma ori over the allocation of 
pre - settlement assets il l ustrates that no appropriate 
mechanism 
currently 
for dispute 
exists. 
resolution 
Area eight 
between 
convener 
Maori 
and 
spokesperson Kara Puketap u, representing tribes from 
Taranaki to Wellington, believes provision must be 
made for a disputes proce ss.230 Puketapu suggests a 
disputes resolution body be used to avoid threatened 
legal action. "Independent ove r seas experts could 
judge if iwi had a valid complaint".231 
The Waitangi Tribuna l has also expressed concern 
in regard to the lack of a n appropriate body to review 
and deal with disputes bet ween Maori. The Tribunal's 
comments were made in re f erence to problems which may 
arise from disputes ove r allocation of settlement 
assets. The Tribunal s t ated:232 
An a llocati on scheme m ay a lso nee d to p rov ide for an 
in ves tiga ti on o f the co mpa rable circum sta nces o f each tribe, 
b y so me app ro pri a te bod y. O ccas io na l rev iews o f the 
a llocat ion sche me a nd a hearing o f ind iv idu a l compla ints may 
a lso be necessa ry. 
The Tribunal does not support a role for itself 
in deliberating over or r e solving such disputes: "This 
tribunal however deals wi t h treaty principles and with 
claims against the Crown and the issues here are 
essentially between Maori".233 The Tribunal 
suggested its jurisdiction is "too circumscribed" to 
deal adequately with disputes between Maori. 
230 See "Fish cha lle nge d ec isio n to cos t NZ milli o ns" The Evening Post, 
We lling to n , New Z ea la nd , 28 Se ptember 1993, 1: "Loca l M aori urge regio na l 
split o f $1 00m fi sh qu ota" The Evening Post, We llin g to n , ew Z ea la nd , 27 
Au g ust 1993, 3. 
23 1 See "Local M aori urge reg io na l spit o f $100 m fi s h qu ota" Th e Evening 
Post, We lling to n , ew Zea la 'ld , 27 A ug ust 1993, 3. 
232 Above n 7, 21. 
233 Above n 232. 
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The Tribunal expressed confidence in the new 
Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission "to work out 
a scheme to be legislated for that would accommodate 
these problems". 234 A proposed framework for the 
resolution of disputes is being developed by the 
Commission.235 
While the settlement framework can be criticised 
for not providing a suitable dispute resolution 
mechanism, it is appropriate that Maori have the 
opportunity to implement a mechanism themselves, 
rather than have one imposed upon them. 
C Resource Rentals 
An important variable over which Maori have no 
control is the setting of resource rentals. 
Government is currently l ooking at full cost recovery 
with effect from 1 October 1994. 236 While the 
fishing industry favours phased introduction of cost 
recovery and the abol i tion of resource rentals, 
government is keen to continue resource rentals.237 
The ability of governme nt to raise rentals is a 
significant variable wh i ch needs to be taken into 
account when considering the value of property rights 
restored to Maori. A rise in resource rentals to 
maximum market value "would dramatically reduce the 
annual fisheries income, and severely undermine the 
market value of the quotas, in turn eroding the 
capital value of fishin g companies and jeopardising 
those borrowings whi c h used the quotas as 
security".238 
234 Abo ve n 232 . 
235 Above n 71, 19. 
236 Ab ove n 71, 21. 
237 Above n 236 
238 Abo ve n 72. 
70 
Kelsey suggests rai s ing resource rentals is one 
of the ways the government will claw back its funding 
of the fisheries settlement. The setting of resource 
rentals provides anothe r uncertain variable when 
assessing the likelihood of success for the fisheries 
settlement. 
VIII CONCLUSION 
It has 
accentuate 
settlement 
discussing 
not 
the 
and 
the 
been t he purpose of this paper to 
negative aspects of the fisheries 
to predi ct its demise. McHugh, 
Deed of Settlement, aptly states: 
"There are, however, enough areas of uncertainty and 
non-justiciability to p ut at least a question mark 
around many aspects of t he Deed".239 Those question 
marks were effectively codified by the Settlement Act. 
The purpose of this pape r has been to identify those 
problem areas with a view to suggest i ng ways in wh i ch 
future settlements could avoid them. 
As a framework fo r future settlements it is 
submitted there are important lessons to be learnt 
from the Sealord deal. Consultation and negotiation 
should not be comp romised by haste and 
confidentiality; potent ial conf licts should be 
identified and resolved b efore, not after settlement; 
and an appropriate forum to resolve future disputes 
should be put in place. 
With regard to the settlement purporting to be 
"full and final" there a r e a number of contingenc i es. 
These include the implementation of a fair scheme for 
allocation of settlement assets; the sustainability of 
the fish resource; the extent to which proposed 
regulations restore Mao r i tino rangatiratanga over 
their traditional non - c ommercial fisheries; and the 
setting of resource renta ls by gov ernment with regard 
to commercial fishing int erests. 
239 Above n 203. 
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It is difficult to assess whether future 
generations will view the settlement as just. While 
the Waitangi Tribunal has indicated it views the 
redress, in terms of quota at least, as sufficient, 
the Tribunal rightly warned Maori against quantifying 
adequate redress. 
Comparison with failed North American models 
suggests significant parallels exist, however, there 
are also significant differences. Ultimately the 
success of the fisheries settlement, it is submitted, 
will rest upon whether it provides all Maori with the 
opportunity to develop an economic base and whether it 
restores Maori tino rangatiratanga over their 
fisheries. Whether the settlement provides the 
genesis to get Maori back into the business of fishing 
is questionable. Maori commercial fishing now takes 
the form of participation in a multi national fishing 
company. Channelling settlement benefits to small 
fishers will be difficult. Dividing and allocating 
quota into small holdings is unlikely to be 
economically viable. Even if this does occur, 
individual or small Maori holdings of quota will not 
have the necessary resource to allow them to invest in 
their own large fishing boats needed to fish for deep 
sea species. The likely scenario is that Maori in 
these situations would need to fish with joint venture 
partners from offshore. For Maori to keep leverage 
in the market much larger allocations of quota will be 
necessary. It is submitted that concerns the 
settlement will not get Maori back into the business 
of fishing but will provide Maori with an investment 
in fishing are likely to be well founded. 
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Whether the settlement restores Maori tino 
rangatiratanga over their sea fisheries is also 
questionable. Proposed regulations have the 
potential to provide Maori with some autonomy over 
traditional non-commercial fishing. Maori tino 
rangatiratanga over commercial fisheries is limited, 
by in large, to the right to be consulted by the 
Crown. 
The partnership which evolves from the Treaty of 
Waitangi is ongoing, thus it may be inappropriate to 
talk in finite terms. Predicting the fisheries 
settlement's definite demise would itself be as 
foolhardy as labelling the settlement "full and 
final". 
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